Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

During the two weeks following the end of Zitadelle, the balance of forces had sharply changed in the Kharkov-Belgorod sector as von Manstein sent II.SS-Panzerkorps to the Mius and von Knobelsdorff’s XXXXVIII Panzerkorps lost 3.Panzer-Division to Operation Roland as well. Soviet deception efforts (Maskirovka) by 38th Army near Sumy convinced von Manstein that Vatutin might try an attack against the boundary of Hoth’s PzAOK 4 and 2.Armee, so he shifted the 7.Panzer-Division and part of 11.Panzer-Division west to that sector.¹⁵¹ In addition, Großdeutschland was sent to reinforce Model’s AOK 9 and Panzer-Regiment 39 was disbanded. By the end of July, Hoth’s PzAOK 4 was a shadow of its former self, with only Generalleutnant Gustav Schmidt’s 19.Panzer-Division and Major Karl von Siver’s Panzer-Abteilung 52 in tactical reserve near Tomarovka. Schmidt’s 19.Panzer-Division had 49 tanks and assault guns, including about 20 Pz IVs, while von Sivers only had 27 operational Panthers. Armee-Abteilung-Kempf’s sole armoured reserve was Oberst Wilhelm Crisolli’s 6.Panzer-Division, which had 28 tanks (mostly Pz III). Most of Hauptmann Clemens-Heinrich Graf von Kagenek’s s.Pz.Abt. 503 was pulled back off the line to rest in Kharkov, but the six operational Tigers were left with XI Armeekorps to defend Belgorod; the handful of Tigers remaining in this critical sector demonstrates the weakness of Zetterling’s Totalausfalle-based statistics to explain the results of Kursk. Despite the fact that the s.Pz.Abt. 503 had only lost seven of its 45 Tigers as Totalausfalle during July, it still had 32 tanks awaiting repairs when the Soviet counter-offensive began. Similarly, 106 Panthers were also still under repair. Not only was the Wehrmacht not receiving enough new Panzers, but it was having greater difficulty repairing damaged ones. Altogether, Hoth and Kempf could barely scrape together 200 tanks and assault guns in the Kharkov-Belgorod sector at the beginning of August 1943.

Vatutin had begun preparations for Rumyantsev on 24 July, but the Stavka had been planning the summer counter-offensive for months. Zhukov arrived at Vatutin’s headquarters as Stavka representative and to assist in coordination between the Voronezh, Steppe and Southwest Fronts. Although Stalin pressed hard for an immediate counter-offensive, Zhukov successfully argued for granting Vatutin 10 days to finalize preparations before commencing the operation. Even with replacements, most of the Voronezh Fronts infantry units were at 60 per cent strength, which was not enough to conduct a protracted operation. Although rushed, Rumyantsev was still much better planned and organized than previous Soviet offensives and the Stavka was generous with resources; three artillery divisions were transferred to Voronezh Front and enough tank replacements to restore all Vatutin’s tank units to combat readiness. Both Katukov’s 1 TA (6 TC, 31 TC, 3 MC) and Rotmistrov’s 5 GTA (18 TC, 29 TC, 5 GMC) were brought back up nearly to authorized strength in terms of tanks and personnel, but at least one-third would be seeing combat for the first time. As Andrei L. Getman, commander of 6 TC noted:

Of course, we did not have a complete set of personnel or equipment. We lacked artillery and some types of small arms. Our tank brigades only had 40–45 tanks, most of which were vehicles that had just been repaired. But it was a considerable force and we waited for the order to bring it down on the enemy.¹⁵²

Operation Rumyantsev, the breakthrough of 1st Tank Army and 5th Guards Tank Army, 8 August 1943.