Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

Hoth ordered what was left of LII Armeekorps to establish hedgehog defences in towns but most of Katukov’s 1 TA blew past the Tomarovka Stützpunkt. Instead, much of 6 GA’s infantry and Kravchenko’s 5 GTC (which was supposed to be an army-level mobile group) became focused on seizing this one town. Rotmistrov’s 5 GTA lagged behind Katukov and 6.Panzer-Division conducted a mobile delay which slowed it even more. Meanwhile, the 53rd and 69th Armies eliminated the German defences north of Belgorod and closed in on the city. In order to envelope the city, Rotmistrov directed General-major Boris M. Skvortsov’s 5 GMC to push in Crisolli’s screen west of Belgorod. By 5 August, General der Panzertruppen Erhard Raus’ XI Armeekorps was nearly surrounded in Belgorod and he was forced to evacuate the city.

Major Karl von Sivers, an educated former cavalry officer, commanded the remaining Panthers, deployed in blocking positions just outside Tomarovka. He had missed Zitadelle due to illness, but was now to able to lead Panthers into combat under more favourable circumstances. By 4 August, T-34s from Morgunov’s 200th Tank Brigade were trying to skirt around Tomarovka to encircle the town, but von Siver’s Panthers engaged them at long range and knocked out seven. When sitting in a defensive position, the Panther’s long 7.5cm gun completely outclassed the opposition. However, by 5 August Tomarovka was nearly surrounded and von Sivers’ Panthers and Schmidt’s 19.Panzer-Division had to abandon the town and retreat southwest down the Vorskla River valley. Before evacuating the city, German pioniers blew up 72 damaged Panthers in the local Werkstatt; Hitler had ordered that no intact Panthers should fall into Soviet hands. Several long columns with thousands of German troops retreated westward, with the Panthers using their long-range gunnery to keep the wolves at bay. Over the course of 5–9 August, von Sivers’ Kampfgruppe, which became separated from the main body, retreated 100km and fought their way through Soviet roadblocks. At one point, Kravchenko’s 5 GTC manoeuvred a company-size force to block the road ahead of the retreating Germans, but von Sivers’ Panthers knocked out eight T-34s and shoved the rest aside. On the road march, the Panthers would have run out of fuel, but von Sivers radioed the Luftwaffe to provide some via airdrop. Finally, von Sivers’ Kampfgruppe linked-up with the Großdeutschland near Akhtyrka on 9 August. In five days of combat, the Panthers had destroyed 40 T-34s at no combat loss to themselves, but 16 Panthers broke down from mechanical faults on the retreat. Von Sivers’ was left with only nine operational Panthers.¹⁵³

Schmidt’s 19.Panzer-Division and the LII Armeekorps fared poorly during the retreat and lacked the firepower of Siver’s Panthers. They had to run a gauntlet with the 27th Army on one side and the 5 GA on the other, making it a shooting gallery for the Soviets. Schmidt’s headquarters was ambushed on 7 August and he and his aid opted to commit suicide near Borisovka.¹⁵⁴ The remnants of the 19.Panzer-Division that reached Akhtyrka were so combat ineffective that they could not even contribute to the defence of the town. The 255.Infanterie-Division was so demolished in the retreat that it was disbanded and the 332.Infanterie-Division simply disappeared from a German Lage Ost situation maps, with the survivors sent rearward to reorganize. German accounts tend to emphasize Soviet tank losses during this phase of Rumyantsev, while skimming over the fact that Heeresgruppe Süd’s infantry was being eviscerated by one hammer blow after another.

Once the scale of the Soviet breakthrough became apparent, von Manstein immediately requested the return of Großdeutschland from Heeresgruppe Mitte and moved the 7. and 11.Panzer-Divisionen from the quiet Sumy sector to reinforce the battered LII Armeekorps. He also managed to get the 18.Panzer-Division from Heeresgruppe Mitte and placed it under Breith’s III. Panzerkorps, which he intended to use to plug the growing gap between Hoth’s PzAOK 4 and Kempf’s forces. However, Katukov’s and Rotmistov’s armour had already created a deep, 50km-wide penetration by the time that these additional forces began to arrive. Kravchenko’s 5 GTC had advanced the furthest. German Panzer units were forced to move straight into combat from their rail unloading sites, with little knowledge of enemy strength or dispositions. In fact, enemy pressure was constantly increasing during Rumyantsev since Vatutin deliberately chose to commit his armies in echelon, meaning that additional formations kept joining the offensive to sustain operational momentum and keep the Germans off balance.

Battle of Bogodukhov, 13–16 August 1943, Totenkopf vs. the 1st Tank Army.