Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

Hitler was furious that Hoth had lost Kiev and he decided to replace him with General der Panzertruppe Erhard Raus. Von Manstein was also rapidly falling out of favour, but he argued with Hitler that it might be possible to conduct another ‘Backhand Blow’ counter-offensive against Rybalko’s 3 GTA and retake Kiev. It was true that strong armoured reinforcements were arriving on the Eastern Front, including the refitted 1.Panzer-Division and the LSSAH (now redesignated as a Panzer-Division), which were very powerful formations, each equipped with one battalion of Panthers and one of Pz IVs. In addition, the newly-formed 25.Panzer-Division was arriving from Norway and the new s.Pz. Abt.509 from Germany with more Tigers. These formations were all at full-strength and totalled 558 tanks, including 172 Panthers and 72 Tigers. Von Manstein also received Das Reich, which still had 33 tanks, including five Tigers. He decided to mass this incoming armour at Bila Tserkva and Berdichev under the control of XXXXVIII Panzerkorps and make a coordinated strike against Rybalko’s left flank at Fastov. Always eager to approve offensives that might restore the situation, Hitler quickly agreed to von Manstein’s recommendations. On the other hand, Hitler had issued Führer Directive 51 on the same day as the beginning of the Soviet breakout from the Lyutezh bridgehead; this edict shifted priority of replacements to the West in anticipation of an Allied amphibious invasion of France in 1944, which meant that von Manstein could not expect significant reinforcements beyond what was already en route.¹⁹⁷

Von Clausewitz, the Prussian military writer, spoke of ‘friction’ in war – an often indiscernible sequence of small events and factors that can gradually undermine an operational plan. It was this friction – some of which was self-inflicted – which caused von Manstein’s second attempted ‘Backhand Blow’ to fail. First, both Hitler and the OKH disrupted planning by shuffling commanders around, seemingly at random. General der Panzertruppen Heinrich Eberbach, commander of the XXXXVIII Panzerkorps, was replaced at the last moment by General der Panzertruppen Hermann Balck, who had been sent to command a corps at Salerno for a month then returned to the Eastern Front.[39] Second, Soviet partisans disrupted German rail traffic west of Fastov and many inbound units were arriving piecemeal and often unloaded at different rail stations, which seriously disrupted preparations to employ them in a coherent manner. Finally, enemy actions did not stop and PzAOK 4’s left flank had virtually fallen apart, allowing the Soviets to advance toward Zhitomir and Korosten. Ideally, von Manstein would have waited until all his units were fully assembled and prepared, but Vatutin was not going to give him that time. Now, von Manstein was forced to conduct a major armoured counter-attack in the manner that the Red Army had employed in 1941 – with sloppy staff work, poor logistics and units committed as they arrived. The decision to begin a major counter-attack during a rainy period when deep mud seriously hampered tactical mobility further impaired German capabilities.

In order to prevent Ivanov’s 7 GTC from over-running the German assembly areas, Raus committed the Das Reich, Kampfgruppe von Wechmar from the 25.Panzer-Division and s.Pz.Abt.509 to local counter-attacks south of Fastov on 9–13 November. Although the Germans claimed to have knocked out over 30 Soviet tanks in several days of tank skirmishing, the results were disappointing. In particular, s.Pz.Abt.509 lost seven Tigers destroyed and only had 14 operational by the time that von Manstein’s counter-offensive was supposed to begin.¹⁹⁸ It was also obvious during the lead-up to the counter-offensive that the newly-arrived 25.Panzer-Division was a ‘soft’ unit that was not ready to be thrust into heavy combat; most of its personnel had been on occupation duty in Norway for years and its original commander, Generalleutnant Adolf von Schell, had no command experience and was in poor health. Guderian tried to stop him from going East with the division but he was overruled by the OKH; within a week, Schell was relieved of command. Indeed, Guderian tried to stop the entire division from being sent East since he believed that it was not combat-ready. In its first action, Kampfgruppe von Wechmar was sent to retake Fastov but panicked when attacked by T-34s and retreated in disorder, suffering heavy losses of men and vehicles.¹⁹⁹