Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1943-1945: Red Steamroller

An even worse development than Rybalko’s threat to the German assembly areas south of Fastov was that Vatutin achieved a major operational breakthrough west of Kiev and he sent General-leytenant Viktor K. Baranov’s 1st Guards Cavalry Corps (1 GCC) as a mobile group east toward the main German supply base at Zhitomir, followed by General-leytenant Kirill S. Moskalenko’s 38th Army. Moskalenko’s army included the 7th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment equipped with 21 of the new KV-85 heavy tanks, which were intended as a stop-gap until the new IS-2 and T-34/85 tanks arrived in early 1944. Frölich’s 8.Panzer-Division tried to block the Zhitomir-Kiev road, but they were forced to retreat by Baranov’s cavalry, whose own armoured support greatly exceeded this threadbare Panzer-Division.[40] On 13 November, the 1 GCC and 23rd Rifle Corps captured Zhitomir.²⁰⁰ The loss of Zhitomir was near-catastrophic since it was a vital rail junction and supply base; without it Heeresgruppe Süd’s line of communications were reduced to single track rail lines. Von Manstein and Raus were forced to reorient their counter-offensive from a classic pincer attack into more of a head-on engagement to retake both Zhitomir and Fastov. Deploying the LSSAH as a covering force near Brusilov to prevent interference from Rybalko’s 3 GTA, Raus sent the 1. and 7.Panzer-Divisionen to converge upon the 1 GCC at Zhitomir. Rybalko’s tanks sparred with LSSAH and repulsed an attempt to capture Brusilov, but otherwise failed to support the isolated 1 GCC, so tanks and Panzergrenadiers stormed Zhitomir on 20 November.

Raus then brought up the 19.Panzer-Division from the south to conduct a double envelopment of Rybalko’s armour at Brusilov, while LSSAH held their attention and 1.Panzer-Division shifted eastward to get around their northern flank. The terrain in the Brusilov area was heavily wooded and littered with ravines, which meant that most tank engagements occurred at ranges under 600 metres and rapid tactical movements were difficult. Once again, the Panther’s long 7.5cm gun easily defeated the T-34s, but mechanical defects sidelined over 50 of 1.Panzer-Division’s Panthers in less than a week of combat. On the night of 23–24 November, 1.Panzer-Division linked up with 19.Panzer-Division, thereby creating a small Kessel at Brusilov. The Germans claimed 3,000 enemy troops killed and 153 tanks destroyed in the pocket, but most of Rybalko’s forces slipped away before the pincers closed.²⁰¹ At that point, rainy weather and logistical problems caused von Manstein to temporarily suspend the XXXXVIII Panzerkorps counter-attack on 26 November. Although Zhitomir had been recaptured, the Germans had accomplished very little given the scale of effort expended.

After a brief pause, the XXXXVIII Panzerkorps resumed its counter-attack on 6 December. By this point, the ground had hardened and the first snow arrived, which improved German tactical mobility. This time, the 1. and 7.Panzer-Divisionen and LSSAH tried to outflank the Soviet 60th Army at Radomyschl from the west, while Das Reich, 8. and 19.Panzer-Divisionen tried to envelop it from the southeast. However, the LSSAH’s panzers ran out of fuel on the second day of the attack, and trying to surround infantry in forested areas with tanks proved rather difficult. Eventually, the German armoured pincers closed and von Manstein claimed three Soviet rifle divisions had been ‘wiped out’ in the four-day Battle of Radomyschl, but based upon the paltry haul of prisoners this was a bald lie.²⁰² Next, von Manstein decided to clear the area east of Korosten, where 38th Army had dug in around the town of Meleni. When Vatutin recognized that von Manstein was committing strong armoured reserves to a counter-offensive, he shifted his forces onto the tactical defensive, moving anti-tank and infantry units forward and pulling Rybalko’s armour back. The Red Army was learning how to be flexible in order to absorb German counter-attacks, rather than rigidly carrying on with a preconceived operational plan, as Timoshenko had done at Kharkov in May 1942. On 18 December, the LSSAH and 1.Panzer-Division attacked Soviet positions near Meleni but quickly ran into a wall of anti-tank guns and mines. For six days the XXXXVIII Panzerkorps kept attacking, but it could not create a Kessel and von Manstein was forced to suspend the counter-offensive on 20 December. Das Reich was so burnt out by the end of this operation that the bulk of the division was sent to rebuild in France, but a brigade-size Kampfgruppe with two Panzergrenadier-Bataillonen, two Panzer-Kompanien (15 tanks), the reconnaissance battalion, two self-propelled artillery batteries and a Pionier-Kompanie remained on the Eastern Front until April 1944.