At 0700 hours on 12 January 1943, Operation
The German XXVI Armeekorps regarded the 67th Army’s crossing of the Neva as the primary threat and reacted by committing most of the available armour to support a counter-attack by the 96.Infanterie-Division at 1615 hours on 13 January. Four Tigers under Oberleutnant Bodo von Gerdtell and 8 Pz III tanks moved up to support an attack by Grenadier-Regiment 284 against the Soviet 268th Rifle Division near Gorodok. The Tigers were camouflaged with whitewash, but were noisy enough to be heard at a distance. The Soviet infantrymen were nor expecting to see enemy tanks, much less Tigers, and many took to their heels, causing the Soviet division to reel back 2km. Govorov committed about 20 T-34s from the 152nd Tank Brigade into this sector to support his infantry, precipitating a close-quarter tank battle. Von Gerdtell’s Tigers did well, shooting up 12 T-34s but six or seven Pz IIIs were knocked out and their crews suffered 17 killed. Furthermore, the infantry battalions from the 96.Infanterie-Division were badly depleted, leaving the Tigers with minimal infantry support. While trying to defend this sector, von Gerdtell was killed the next day and 1./s. Pz. Abt. 502 was ground down under constant artillery fire.
Meanwhile Khrustitsky’s T-60 tanks and infantry from the 67th Army continued to press eastward, across terrain that the Tigers could not traverse, toward a link-up with the slowly advancing 2nd Shock Army. For reasons that defy military logic, the German XXVI Armeekorps commander moved a Kampfgruppe Hühner with five Tigers, four Pz III and five StuG III to the town of Shlissel’burg on 16 January, just as the jaws of the two Soviet armies were closing in from both side of the Siniavino corridor. The Germans were desperate to hold a work settlement known as WS-5 that was on a key trail intersection in the middle of the corridor and for two days Kampfgruppe Hühner fended off one attack after another. However, the terrain was perfect for infantry infiltration and the Germans were road-bound, so Kampfgruppe Hühner was gradually isolated and cut off. On the morning of 18 January, the Soviets finally stormed WS-5 and troops from the two fronts linked up at 0930 hours. Khrustitsky’s tiny T-60 tanks were in at the kill; while its 20mm cannon was normally not useful in tank-v-tank combat, it was very effective in destroying the wooden buildings in WS-5. The loss of WS-5 completely cut off the 8,000 troops in Kampfgruppe Hühner, who were now determined to break out to the south before it was too late.