Putting the tanks in the lead, Kampfgruppe Hühner moved south along a trail, through an area consisting of peat bogs and scrub forest. Soviet anti-tank gunners were waiting and they hammered the German armoured column, which could barely move off the road; four Pz IIIs were knocked out and even a Tiger was knocked out by 76.2mm fire. The German column tried to fight its way through the ambush, but the Tigers were hit repeatedly and disabled one by one. Two Tigers were blown up by their crews and another was burning. The last Tiger accidentally drove off the trail into a peat bog and became hopelessly mired. The Germans tried to retrieve this tank or destroy it, but were driven off by Soviet fire. Five of Khrustitsky’s T-60 tanks managed to hook tow cables to the abandoned Tiger and pull it free of the bog – the first intact Tiger captured. Although all five Tigers were lost, most of the troops of Kampfgruppe Hühner were able to escape to the south. By the end of 18 January, Operation
Unfortunately for the front-line soldiers on both sides, Marshal Zhukov regarded Operation
Combat experience from the 67th Army shows that the employment of tank units had major deficiencies that resulted in unjustifiable heavy losses of tanks. Combined-arms commanders introduced tanks into battle too quickly, without taking the necessary time to prepare tanks for battle, or for reconnaissance or for coordination, nor did they use engineers to prepare the routes for tanks. The commanders of [rifle] divisions and regiments did not coordinate their actions with tanks on the battlefield… Tanks rushed at the enemy defences without adequate artillery support and tank units were usually not on the artillery radio net…38