The Augustan Empire 43 BC

According to App. BCiv. v.10.39,4²> 'bey fled to the Parthian king after their deposition: not improbable, cf. Buchheim i960 (c 49) 27.

Tyrant in 42 when he invaded Galilee (Joseph. BJ 1.238-9, AJ xiv.298); but Antony's letter in 41 (next note) is addressed only to the magistrates and council (AJ xiv.314). Cf. Weinstock RE xiv 1803.

support for Cassius, but here Antony knew better than to play into the hands of the anti-Roman nobility. Herod and his brother Phasael were recognized as 'tetrarchs'; Judaea even recovered some territory it had lost to the Phoenician cities.³⁵ And Egypt, with all its wealth, would inevitably be important. Momentously, Antony summoned its queen to meet him in Cilicia.

Plutarch and Shakespeare have immortalized the famous meeting on the Cydnus - the marvellous gilded barge, the purple sails, Cleopatra's display as Aphrodite; and, delightfully, much of the description is likely to be true.³⁶ The queen's relations with Antony swiftly became more than diplomatic: their twins were born only a year later; and he spent the winter of 41-40 with her in Alexandria - a winter of careless frolics, so the story later went.³⁷ But there were bloody elements too. Cleopatra was still insecure on her throne, threatened by her sister Arsinoe; Antony had Arsinoe dragged from sanctuary in Ephesus and murdered. Tyre had to surrender Serapion, the admiral who had betrayed Cleopatra's fleet to Cassius and Brutus; Arados was forced to give up a pretender to the Egyptian throne. Later writers naturally dwelt on the infatuation which forced Antony to such gruesomeness; but he could reasonably feel that it made political sense to favour Cleopatra in this way. He was regularly to favour strong, talented rulers, people like Polemo in Pontus or Herod in Judaea, people on whom he felt he could rely; and he could certainly rely on Cleopatra. Any infatuation was clearly under control; at least, for the present. In the spring of 40 he left her, and did not return for nearly four years.

For by the spring Alexandria was no place for Antony. Worrying news had been arriving about disorder in Italy, and now there was a more immediate threat in Asia Minor itself. During 41 Antony had probably been preparing for an offensive war against Parthia - by the end of the season he had indeed taken the border town of Palmyra in Syria. It seems that Parthia, naturally enough, responded by gathering a force in Mesopotamia to meet the evident threat. But, after Antony had departed to Alexandria for the winter, the Parthians decided to seize the moment and attack Roman Asia Minor themselves;³⁸ and, far from waging a glorious campaign of vengeance, Antony had to hasten to put up what defence he could. The Parthian command was shared between the crown-prince Pacorus and Q. Labienus himself, son of that famous commander of Caesar who went over to Pompey at the beginning of the civil war. Brutus and Cassius had sent him to seek aid from Orodes, and

³⁵ Tyre, Sidon, Antioch and Aradus: cf. Joseph. A] xiv.304-23, quoting verbatim Antony's letters to the Jews and to Tyre. * Plut. Ant. 26, with Pelling 1988 (в 138) aJloc.

Plut. Ant. 28-9; cf. App. BCiv. v.i 1.43-4.

Dio XLviii. 24.6-8, explicidy placing the decision after Labienus had heard of Antony's 'departure to Egypt'.

he had still been at the Parthian court when news of Philippi arrived. Wisely, he stayed where he was; and we need not doubt that he played an important role in persuading Orodes to attack now, when he rightly gauged that Antony might be vulnerable. It is easy but unfair to see Labienus as a latter-day Coriolanus, a renegade turning against his country through pique. In fact, republicans had long since been playing for Parthian support. Pompey had sought an alliance with Orodes against Caesar;³⁹ a few years later the Parthians had been helping the republican troops of Q. Caecilius Bassus against Caesarians in Syria;⁴⁰ Parthian contingents had even fought in the Philippi campaign.⁴¹ Over in the West, men could equally toy with the notion of exploiting Gallic nobles in a Roman civil war; might they not show themselves worthier champions of liberty than the Romans themselves?⁴² Doubtless there was hypocrisy in such proud phrases; but it was not confined to Labienus. He was indeed largely welcomed by the Roman garrisons in Syria,⁴³ and apparently in Asia too.⁴⁴