Читаем The Augustan Empire 43 BC полностью

At first Antony, far off in the East, thought it best to send no clear response, though he certainly knew what was going on. Everyone made sure of that, with Octavian sending confidential messengers and the colonies too taking care that their plight was known.[27] He had probably not planned or encouraged the troubles himself: it was a nice judgment whether he really stood to gain more than lose by the exchanges. Now he might naturally relish Octavian's embarrassment, but he could hardly come out openly against him; Octavian after all was merely pursuing his part of a shared bargain. Besides, Antony could not let his own veterans down, or allow Octavian to win more of their gratitude. He might need them again soon. A studied vagueness about his own views would indeed make sense, allowing him to exploit the outcome whichever way it went: there were times in antiquity when the slowness and unreliability of communications could be useful. But the consequences were very unfortunate. Unsure of his wishes, confused by various reports and missives,60 his supporters in Italy were bewildered. Just as on several occasions in 44 and 4 j, army officers and the veterans themselves pressed for a compromise,61 and so did two senatorial embassies to L. Antonius; but in the summer of 41 it came to war.

L. Antonius occupied Rome with an army, then marched north, hoping to link with Pollio and Ventidius. Operations in Etruria were complex and confused, but in the autumn L. Antonius was forced into Perusia and besieged by Octavian, Agrippa and Salvidienus Rufus. Still unsure of Antony's wishes, Pollio and Ventidius decided not to intervene. Plancus, arriving from the south, made the same choice. That made thirteen Antonian legions which stood by, inactive; L. Antonius himself had no more than eight.62 The siege wore on, bitterly. Both sides occupied idle moments by adding obscene graffiti to their sling-bullets, musing on Antonius' baldness, Octavian's backside, and Fulvia's private parts; Octavian himself wrote some peculiarly rude elegiacs at Fulvia's expense.63 The city eventually fell, amid scenes of dreadful bloodshed, in the early spring of 40. L. Antonius' veterans were spared: interestingly, their old comrades on Octavian's side interceded for them.64 Antonius himself was received honourably by Octavian, and indeed was sent to govern Spain (he died soon afterwards). Fulvia was allowed to flee to Athens. The ordinary dwellers of Perusia were not so fortunate. All the town-councillors except one were killed. Octavian's enemies soon elaborated the story, with talk of a human sacrifice of 300 senators and knights at the altar of Divus lulius\bb but the unembroidered truth was horrifying enough. The city itself was given over to Octavian's troops to plunder, and it burnt to the ground. A few years later the Umbrian Propertius chose to conclude his first book of witty love elegies with a disquieting and unexpected coda, two short stark poems on the suffering of the Perusine war (1.21, 22).

If a generation before Pompey had seemed an adulescentulus carnufex, Octavian was surely emerging as his equal. But he had not let the veterans down, and he had emphatically established his control of Italy. Soon, indeed, he would seem master of the entire West, when Calenus died in the summer of 40 and he swiftly occupied Gaul as well. Calenus' legions seem to have come over fairly readily, and so did two legions of Plancus in Italy. Perhaps they felt Octavian was now the more reliable champion of their interests.66

Cf. App. BCiv. v. 29.11 2 (a letter which Appian sensed might have been forged), 31.120.

App. BCiv. v.20.79-23.94.

App. BCiv. v.50.208, cf. 24.95, 29.114-30.115; Brunt 1971 (a 9) 494-6.

ILLRP 1106-18; cf. Hallett 1977 (c 109). Mart. x:.2o quotes Octavian's verses.

App. BCiv. v.46.196—47.200.

Suet. Aug. 15.1; cf. Dio XLVin.14.4: but App. BCiv. v.48.201-2 makes clear that senators and knights were spared. In general, Harris 1971 (e 55) 301—2.

Cf. Dio XLVin.20.3; Aigner 1974 (c 3) 113.

No wonder Antony was concerned. He hurried back to Italy in the midsummer of 40; and he arrived in some strength.

V. BRUNDISIUM AND MISENUM, 4O-39 B.C.

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