Читаем The Augustan Empire 43 BC полностью

The successes of Augustus abroad suggest a drive to consolidate the empire, to create a united dominion under Roman rule.2 The princeps, it can be argued, conceived a broad-gauged military strategy, based on economy of force, which, through a combination of mobile troops and loyal dependencies, provided both for internal security and frontier stability.3

Theoretical formulations in retrospect, however, fail to catch the dynamics of a volatile situation. And they slight the diversity of geographical, political, diplomatic and cultural considerations that faced Augustus in the vast expanse of the Roman world. One need not assume that the princeps had a structured blueprint for empire. Nor did his actions adhere to a uniform pattern imposed on all sectors of the imperium Komanum. Different circumstances in different areas provoked a variety of responses, sometimes cautious, sometimes bold, occasionally calculated, often extemporaneous. Augustus was less concerned with a systematic plan for world dominion than with a systematic construct of his image as world conqueror.

Virg. Лея. 1.278-9; Livy, xxi.30.10, xxiv.)8.8; Hor. Carm. iv.13.13-16.

Cf. Kienast 1982 (c 136) 366-70, 406-20. 3 Luttwak 1976 (a 37) 13-50.

•47

i. egypt, ethiopia and arabia

The deaths of Antony and Cleopatra left Octavian as master of Egypt. He would not permit that land to slip from his grasp again. Its wealth and resources in the hands of a rival would constitute a serious menace, and its role as a granary could be critical. Egypt became a province in 30 B.C., but no ordinary province. Octavian took full responsibility for gover­nance. He appointed an equestrian prefect to administer the nation, and allowed no Roman senator or high-ranking eques even to visit it without his authorization. The princeps reckoned Egypt a place apart and kept close surveillance over its affairs.4

The prefect of Egypt supervised collection of revenue in the highly centralized fiscal system, exercised judicial duties, and commanded the three legions and auxiliary troops stationed in the country.5 The forces seem adequate for the preservation of security and the entrenchment of Roman control.

Yet Octavian did not content himself with the acquisition of Egypt. His first appointee as praefectus Aegypti, C. Cornelius Gallus, both poet and military man, pressed for expansion from the start. He quelled revolts in Heroonpolis, east of the Delta, and in the Thebaid. That was an appropriate and expected part of the job. But Gallus had no intention of stopping there. He took his forces southward, beyond the First Cataract of the Nile, where, so he claimed, neither Roman nor Egyptian arms had ever penetrated before. Gallus received representatives of the king of Ethiopia, accepted the king under his protection, and installed a dynast to rule over Triacontaschoenus, evidently as buffer zone between the realms of Egypt and Ethiopia. All this had been accomplished by the spring of 29 B.C. when Gallus erected a trilingual inscription in Latin, Greek and hieroglyphics to celebrate his exploits.6 The prefect's pen­chant for self-display eventually proved fatal. He had images of himself set up all over Egypt and a record of his achievements inscribed even on the pyramids. Such hybris, combined with a host of other alleged misdeeds, brought about Gallus' recall, renuntiatio amicitiae by Augustus, accusation, conviction and suicide perhaps in 26 в.с.7 But nothing in the charges raised objections to Gallus' pushing Roman authority beyond the First Cataract and obtaining the homage of Ethiopian princes. Augustus may have frowned on his prefect's over-zealousness in taking personal credit for Roman expansion — but he did not disavow the

Tac. Ann. 11.59; Hist, i.ii; Dio li.17.1-5. See the recent treatments, with bibliography, by Geraci 1983 (e 924) 128-46 and 1988 (E926), who rightly questions the common idea that Augustus treated Egypt as a 'private preserve'. It was considered as one among Rome's revenue producing provinces; Veil. Pat. 11.39.2; Strab. xvn.1.12 (797C); Tac. Ann. xv.36; Huzar 1988 (c 277) 370-9.

On his position, see Geraci «983 (E924) 163-76; Huzar 1988 (c 277) 352-62; and below, ch. 14b.

ILS 8994, 8995; Strab. xvii.i.] 5 (819Q. 7 Dio Lin.23.j-7; Suet. Aug. 66.

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egypt, ethiopia and arabia

expansionism. Installation of a client prince and acceptance of the Ethiopian ruler under Roman protection appealed to the pride — and probably stemmed from the policy — of Augustus.

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