The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945

The ‘revenge attack’ was nevertheless not intended to be random retaliation. The London raids fitted into the framework of the planned pattern of the campaign, which was still predicated on the idea of a cross-Channel invasion at some point in September. After the brief assault on the RAF, the air force schedule was to move to other urban targets further inland, employing predominantly night-time ‘destroyer’ raids, with a final heavy blow at London just before Operation Sea Lion to create a major refugee problem.⁹⁵ Operations against targets in the London area were already under way weeks before Hitler’s speech and there were detailed target plans for the capital – known on the German side by the acronym Loge, from Londongebiet (London area) – showing dock areas, communication targets, power stations and armaments works, which had been distributed to the Fliegerkorps in July. The object of the attack was to do serious damage to London’s capacity as Britain’s major port, to undermine the infrastructure necessary for the war economy as well as to intimidate the population. German bombing was intended to affect morale indirectly, rather than undermine it by deliberately indiscriminate or terror attacks. It was recognized that operations against crowded port areas would necessarily involve damage to residential housing and civilian casualties, but this was not regarded as a sufficient reason to abandon port facilities as a target.⁹⁶ The combination of military-economic targeting and indirect pressure on morale was regarded, according to a later wartime account of the campaign, as ‘the principal and most effective form of operation’.⁹⁷

Air force units were under orders to identify and hit precise strategic targets. If they could not, an alternative target was to be found. In extreme cases they were under orders to bring back their bombload and, if conditions permitted, to jettison the bombs on approaching their home base at a height of 30 metres from the ground, low enough to prevent the fuse from being activated, so that the bombs could be used again.⁹⁸ The insistence on identifying and attacking strategic targets was no doubt done partly to emphasize the contrast between British and German practice, but it also made military sense because it maximized the impact on the enemy’s war effort of a given weight of bombs. Tactical instructions to German pilots issued in the autumn of 1940 insisted on the importance of achieving a high concentration of strikes on a designated target. When the air force chief of staff asked Hitler in mid-September whether he approved of deliberate attacks on residential areas as well, Hitler said no. His rejection was recorded in his headquarters war diary: ‘Terror attacks against purely residential areas will be held back as a very last resort, and for the moment will not be used.’ War-essential targets in London, including airfields, were given priority; terror was only to be used if the RAF unleashed a similar programme against German towns.⁹⁹

The German Air Force saw the opening assault on London on 7 September 1940 as the opportunity to achieve the operational success and wide publicity that had been denied on ‘Eagle Day’. Bomber groups had been sent their instructions on 4 September. The London area was divided up into target zones for each group, each terminating in the London docks. The plan was to attack in three waves, the first attracting British fighters, but the second two free to bomb as enemy fighters were forced to land and refuel. The bombers were instructed to carry 20 per cent of their load as ‘flame bombs’ (Flammenbombe C250), large oil bombs designed to ignite the highly flammable material in London’s docklands, and 30 per cent as delayed-action bombs, to hinder efforts to fight the fires. Close formation and concentration of effort were called for.¹⁰⁰ The raid itself was a considerable success because Fighter Command was positioned to expect further attacks on the fighter stations rather than a mass raid on London. A large formation of 348 bombers, escorted by 617 Me109s and Me110s, was able to penetrate through to the London docks and the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich and drop around 300 tonnes of bombs at 5 p.m. A second wave attacked at 8 p.m., dropping a further 330 tonnes, and bomber activity went on until the early hours of 8 September. Major fires started throughout the dock and port area and 436 Londoners were killed. The German Air Force lost 40 aircraft, the RAF 28. The sheer size of the fighter screen made it difficult for the enemy fighters to reach the bomber squadrons and a high concentration of effort was indeed achieved.