The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945

None of this was in the end sufficient to convince Hitler that the risk of embarking on Sea Lion was worth taking. He had already expressed reservations in July about the possibility of defeating Britain. Against a background of wrangling between the army and the navy over how wide a beachhead could be supported, Hitler waited to see how the air war unfolded. On 3 September, D-Day was fixed for 20–21 September, but by mid-September it was evident from continued attacks by RAF Bomber Command against the assembled shipping and stores for the invasion that the enemy air force was far from defeated. Admiral Raeder and the army leadership began to explore indirect strategies – cutting Britain off in the Mediterranean by the occupation of Gibraltar, Malta and Suez, an intensified blockade – but Hitler still hesitated, perhaps in the hope that the new wave of bombing in London might still force the British leadership to negotiate. On 14 September in discussion with the three service chiefs he reasserted his view that the quickest way to end the war was to invade, but he concluded that the air force, though poised for victory, had not yet achieved air mastery.¹⁰⁴ Persistent poor weather and the threat of British naval power contributed to the declining prospects for Sea Lion. Hitler reviewed the situation again on 17 September but could see little change; two days later Sea Lion was postponed indefinitely. Hitler was in the end unimpressed by the performance of the air force. In September he was shown less optimistic estimates of RAF strength than the ones Göring used. These indicated, correctly, that there were still at least 600 fighters in RAF units; interviews with the fighter aces Adolf Galland and Werner Mölders in the week after the postponement confirmed that the situation in the air war was more even than Göring and air force propaganda had suggested. Galland later recalled that his candid account of an RAF far from defeat was greeted by Hitler with nods of agreement.¹⁰⁵

It has never been entirely clear what Hitler expected the air force to do once Sea Lion failed to materialize. The air force failure was only relative, since a great deal of damage had been done by the German Air Force in August and September, but air force action had not been sufficient to establish air superiority over southern England for any length of time. The explanations for this failure are well known, but are worth reiterating. The intelligence assessment of the enemy played a part throughout in shaping the German approach to the battle. German estimates in mid-September were notoriously wide of the mark. Instead of 300, the RAF had 656 operational fighters on 19 September with 202 more in immediate reserve and 226 in preparation for transfer to units; there were over 1,500 pilots available in the second half of September. The German fighter arm, in contrast, was down to 74 per cent of its pilot strength (around 700–800) by the beginning of September, and suffered losses of 23.1 per cent of its personnel throughout the month; serviceable fighter strength hovered around 500. The loss of crew over England was permanent, 638 identified bodies, 967 prisoners. This was never the contest of the Few against the Many. High attrition – a total of 1,733 aircraft lost from 10 July to 31 October, against 915 RAF fighters – could not be made good from German production. Between June and October 1940 the German aircraft industry turned out 988 single-engine fighters, but British factories produced 2,091 Hurricanes and Spitfires. There were problems with the planning and organization of German aircraft production (to be explored later), but the central problem facing the German Air Force during the daylight fighting was the failure to anticipate serious, centrally directed fighter defences. The sustained strength of Fighter Command compelled the German fighter force to accompany the bombers more closely, exposing them as well to greater risk, increasing the level of combat attrition and making it in the end impossible to sustain the daylight campaign.¹⁰⁶

THE FIRST STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE