The Corporation and the Twentieth Century

118. This claim goes back at least as far as Stephenson (1930) in his biography of Nelson Al- drich, the strongly pro-tariff Republic Senator from Rhode Island, about whom we shall hear more later. See also Fainsod and Gordon (1941). DiLorenzo (1985) and Hazlett (1992) have resurrected this idea in the context of the Antitrust Act.

119. Irwin (1998b). In economics jargon, the Republicans were arguing that the tariff system was on the downward-sloping portion of the Laffer curve. By Irwin’s calculations, it was the Democrats who were right. Indeed, the failure of the McKinley tariff to reduce revenues argu- ably cost Harrison his job, as voters associated the surplus with excessive federal spending.

120. Holmes (1994).

121. Letwin (1965, p. 86). The plank read: “Judged by Democratic principles, the interests of the people are betrayed when, by unnecessary taxation, trusts and combination are permitted to exist, which, while unduly enriching the few that combine, rob the body of our citizens.” The phrase “unnecessary taxation” here refers to tariffs, of course.

122. New York Times, August 29, 1888, p. 4. See also Chicago Daily Tribune, September 1, 1888, p. 1.

123. Thorelli (1955, p. 175).

124. Thorelli (1955, p. 188).

125. Chandler (1977, p. 320) was able to identify only eight enterprises in this period that

were actually organized as trusts. The six of these that were successful were all in distilling or refining industries with similar technological problems and economies of scale. Sherman under- stood this as well. In a speech in 1888 responding to Cleveland’s message to Congress, Sherman said: “The only striking examples of ‘organized combination’ are by the distillers of whisky, the refiners of sugar, the cotton-seed-oil trust, and the Standard Oil Company, and as to these the President is silent” (Thorelli 1955, p. 167).

126. Stigler (1985).

127. Troesken (2002). See also Olien and Olien (1995).

128. Minnesota v. Barber 36 U.S. 313 (1890).

129. Libecap (1992). The cattle raisers and slaughterhouses also succeeded in pushing

through in 1891 a federal meat-inspection act, a precursor of the more famous 1906 act, in order to provide quality certification for the export market at taxpayer expense. The large packers were split on the measure, as some were wary of federal intervention in their business and felt their

562 Notes to Chapter 2

own brand and reputation provided adequate quality certification (Olmstead and Rhode 2015, p. 183).

130. Coolidge (1910, p. 444).

131. 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§1–7 (1890).

132. Primm (1910).

133. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).

134. McCurdy (1979).

135. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Joint

Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 136. Bittlingmayer (1985).

137. Bonbright and Means (1932, p. 69).

138. Bittlingmayer (1985); Lamoreaux (1985).

139. Bittlingmayer (1982).

140. Lamoreaux (1985, p. 188).

141. Samuel H. Williamson, “Annualized Growth Rate and Graphs of Various Historical

Economic Series,” Measuring Worth, https://www.measuringworth.com/growth (accessed October 16, 2014).

142. Gordon (1999, p. 124).

143. Allen (2014, p. 332).

144. Langlois (2003b).

145. Chernow (1998, pp. 149–50). Writing in the North American Review in 1889 (pp. 141–42),

Andrew Carnegie put it this way: “Goods will not be produced at less than cost. This was true when Adam Smith wrote, but it is not quite true today. When an article was produced by a small manufacturer, employing, probably at his own home, two or three journeymen and an apprentice or two, it was an easy matter for him to stop production. As manufacturing is carried on today, in enormous establishments with five or ten millions of dollars of invested capital and with thousands of workers, it costs the manufacturer much less to run at a loss per ton or per yard than to check his production. While continuing to produce may be costly, the manufacturer knows too well that stoppage would be ruin. His brother manufacturers are, of course, in the same situation. They see the savings of years, as well, perhaps as the capital they have succeeded in borrowing, becoming less and less, with no hope of change in the situation. It is in soil thus prepared that anything promising relief is gladly welcomed. Combinations, syndicates, trusts—they will try anything.”

146. Davis (1966).

147. Calomiris and Haber (2014).

148. Porter (1973, p. 75).

149. Telser (1984, p. 271).

150. Porter (1973, p. 76).

151. Davis (1966, p. 269); Porter (1973, p. 77).

152. Navin and Sears (1955).

153. On ownership of iron deposits as the primary barrier to entry in steel in this period, see

Parsons and Ray (1975). As we will see, even U.S. Steel steadily lost market share after its found- ing (McCraw and Reinhardt 1989).

154. Chernow (1998, p. 431).

155. Lamoreaux (1985, p. 183); Livermore (1935, p. 70); Porter (1973, p. 81).

Notes to Chapter 3 563

Chapter 3: The Progressive Era