The Corporation and the Twentieth Century

83. Dupré (1999); Juma (2016, chapter 4). New Hampshire, Vermont, and West Virginia

required margarine to be colored pink. Despite the privations of depression and war, these regu- lations remained in place until the 1960s. Future Nobel Laureate Theodore Schultz resigned in protest from his position as head of economics at Iowa State College (now University) after the College suppressed a pamphlet he had written urging the use of margarine as a cheap source of fatty acids during World War II.

84. Olmstead and Rhode (2015).

85. Coppin and High (1999); Wood (1985); Young (1989).

86. Law and Libecap (2004).

87. Coppin and High (1999); Law (2006). Wiley apparently angered Teddy Roosevelt by

attempting to ban saccharine, which Roosevelt was in the habit of using. 88. Carpenter (2001).

89. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999); Morck (2010).

568 Notes to Chapter 3

90. For an authoritative discussion, see The Oxford Handbook of Business Groups, especially the synthetic essay by Colpan and Hikino (2010).

91. Granovetter (1995).

92. The term horizontal is from Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006).

93. Langlois (2013a).

94. Dalzell (1987).

95. By contrast, the much larger textile system of Lancashire, which had started much earlier

and grown up more organically, operated as an industrial district—a business group in the most networky sense—coordinating through thick markets rather than equity ties. The American mill companies themselves were far more vertically integrated than their English counterparts, having to engage initially in the complete series of stages of production, including the making of machinery, stages whose outputs could be had in the market in Britain. The machine shops of these and other textile mills eventually spun off what would become the American machine- tool industry (Rosenberg 1963).

96. Moody (1904, p. 155).

97. Bell (1960, p.40).

98. Kramer (1964, p. 294). Morgan partner George W. Perkins averred that naming all of-

ficers and directors was a policy that the House of Morgan “found indispensable in making their combinations” (Garraty 1960, p. 133)

99. I have discussed many of these issues elsewhere (Langlois 2013a). See also Morck (2010) 100. Livesay (1975, p. 93).

101. Johnson et al. (2000).

102. Churella (2012, pp. 90ff.). Needless to say, the legislature refused to grant the B&O a

Pennsylvania charter.

103. Livesay (1975); Nasaw (2006).

104. The Pennsylvania Railroad was in fact a pyramidal group, as it owned only one-third of

the stock of the Pennsylvania Steel Company, the outfit that first licensed the Bessemer process (Temin 1964, p. 129).

105. Temin (1964, p. 154).

106. Temin (1964, pp. 190–93).

107. Hogan (1971a, chapter 14); Moody (1904, pp. 152 ff.).

108. Hidy and Hidy (1952, pp. 310–12).

109. Chandler (1977, p. 424).

110. Allen (1935, p.81).

111. Passer (1952).

112. Carlson (1991).

113. Chandler (1977, p. 428).

114. GE “came to resemble the sort of integrated enterprise that George Westinghouse had

developed to supply the railroads and was then creating in the electrical industry” (Usselman 1992, p. 304). Chandler (1990, pp. 215–16) implies that Westinghouse Electric was less manage- rial than GE, but the difference was mostly in the area of finance: in order to keep his enterprises closely held, George Westinghouse relied on short-term loans and refused to sell equity widely. This led to bankruptcy after the panic of 1907, and to a reorganization orchestrated by Jacob Schiff. George Westinghouse lost effective control and was out of the company by 1911. Westing- house Electric became the Kuhn, Loeb counterpart of Morgan’s GE.

Notes to Chapter 3 569

115. Buchanan (1936).

116. Statement of Owen D. Young to the Temporary National Economic Committee Regard- ing the Formation of Capital of the General Electric Company, Washington, DC, May 17, 1939, reprinted as an appendix to Hammond (1941, p. 417).

117. Buchanan (1936, p. 37); Hughes (1979).

118. Moody (1904, pp. 421–28).

119. Bruère (1908).

120. MacDougall (2006); Miranti (2016); Smith (1985); Stehman (1925). Bell had initially