The Origins of Autocracy

The crucial process of peasant differentiation was in no way impeded. Rather, the Muscovite administration actively sup­ported the judicial defense of private (nonfeudal) property, lit­tle by little bringing into being a Russian proto-bourgeoisie in the course of the economic boom of the first half of the six­teenth century. Thus, gradually, economic limitations of power were formed.

The conditions for a broad-based debate over the future of the country were created. This developed over the course of the entire "century of choice," chiefly in connection with the pro­spective reform of the church. Thus, gradually, the ideological limitations of power were formed.

In creating the bureaucratic apparatus appropriate to a cen­tralized state, and gradually limiting the archaic privileges of the hereditary aristocracy (the boyars), a mortal struggle be­tween these two elites was nevertheless avoided. Both elites learned the art of interacting in the decision-making process. The political functioning of the traditional ("patrimonial") ar­istocracy, which by reason of its hereditary status was indepen­dent of the state, thus represented a strong social limitation of power.

10. Muscovy showed itself capable of instituting local self-govern­ment, a system of trial by jury, and even something reminiscent of a national parliament—the Assembly of the Land (Zemskii Sobor).

For all these reasons, it may confidently be asserted that the Kievan, or European, side of the Russian tradition was dominant throughout the "century of choice." At least until 1560 it might have seemed that, by continuing in the direction of re-Europeanization, Muscovy would once again join the European family of nations, as in the days of Kievan Rus'. The sum of gradually accumulating limitations on royal power, although not touching directly on the political sphere, never­theless deprived this power of its unlimited character.

4. The Choice

Certainly, there were sinister signs, too, that the autocratic tradition was preparing to reassert itself.

Reform of the church had apparently reached an impasse by the 1550s. Unlike the states of Sweden, Denmark, or England, the Mus­covite state appeared incapable of breaking the resistance of the powerful church hierarchy. On the contrary, in seeking to preserve the enormous worldly wealth of the church, the counter-reformist clergy managed not only to work out all the ideological preconditions for an autocratic "revolution from above" but also to defeat the pro­ponents of reform politically. Thus, they cleared the way for a new Tatar conquest of Rus', so to speak—this time not by the Tatars but by its own Orthodox tsar.

Side by side with peasant differentiation, which promised Russia a vigorous middle class in the near future, there appeared another pro­cess of differentiation, involving the feudal landowners, which may for convenience be called feudal differentiation. A growing class of small service gentry (pomeshchiki) sprang up, which unlike the heredi­tary aristocracy depended on the state not only for its prosperity but for its very existence. This class, the backbone of Muscovite military power, hungered above all for land. And, in spite of the limited land resources at the disposal of the state, this hunger had somehow to be accommodated. Here lay the greatest danger to re-Europeanization, for if it were satisfied at the expense of the peasantry, this would mean an end to peasant differentiation and the extinction of the nas­cent Russian middle class. Thus, two major social processes—two dif­ferentiations—competed in Muscovy. The outcome of their rivalry was to decide the fate of Russia.

Finally, the heir of the former imperial power, the Crimean khan­ate, still held the entire South of the country, with its black earth, the nation's main breadbasket and chief hope. The Tatars not only de­prived the country of the lion's share of national wealth, but con­stantly threatened its normal functioning. And, even more impor­tant, if so inspired by Turkey, they might at any moment renew the traditional colonial claims of the Golden Horde.

Under these conditions, the political role of the tsar took on huge significance. I am stressing the political role, the objective position rather than the personality of the tsar, because what really mattered, as I see it, was that:

Land to satisfy the service gentry could be obtained from one of three sources: by confiscation of the enormous holdings of the church (i.e., reform of the church); by confiscation of peas­ant holdings; or from the rich South—that is, in essence, by confiscation of Tatar holdings.