"The Muscovite high nobility or service elite occupied the highest positions in a society and an administrative system that shared characteristics with many contemporary polities and societies but was, in the final analysis, unique," writes Robert Crummey, a modern American historian. On the one hand, this was a patrimonial, aristocratic elite, whose representatives, "like their counterparts to the West . . . derived the core of their income from ownership of land and power over the peasants who lived on it." On the other hand, they were "imprisoned in a system of universal service to an absolute ruler like the
Ottoman. It was precisely this combination of land ownership, family solidarity, and compulsory state service that made the Muscovite high nobility unique."[15]
I am in full agreement with this perceptive conclusion. It is exactly because of this uniqueness that I call the Russian political structure an autocracy, differing both from absolutism (where there was no obligatory service) and from despotism (where the elite was never in a position to transform itself into an aristocracy). The only thing which disturbs me in Crummey's schema is the chronology. In fact, up to the middle of the sixteenth century, refusal to perform service was not regarded as a crime in Russia (at least according to law), and two centuries later it again ceased to be regarded as such. If we employ Crummey's criteria, it transpires that the Russian elite (and the Russian political structure) was "unique" only during these two centuries. And before this? And afterwards? Was it then perhaps similar to its Western counterparts? Or to the elite of the Ottoman Empire? Why was it that the Ottoman elite appears to have been incapable of overcoming the bondage of universal service, while the Russian elite succeeded?
We see still more clearly the results of the conventional approach (without any "what ifs" at all) in the attempt of another American historian to divide the history of the Muscovite elite (1450-1700) into three periods. "The first period," Richard Hellie writes,
lasted about a century, with 1556 serving as a suitable terminus. The first service class revolution in Russian history, initiated by mobilizing land (the
Let us not go too deeply into Hellie's periodization (which, incidentally, leaves us completely ignorant of why a
To be sure, the free movement of Russian peasants was indeed restricted in the fifteenth century, and the Russian nobles usually served. What is more, the traditional system of dividing inheritances among male heirs made service especially attractive to the latter as a means of maintaining and increasing their wealth. But, after all, the system of dividing inheritances still existed in Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, after universal service was abolished, and the Russian elite managed to cope with it without so much as giving a thought to returning to obligatory service. Why, then, would it have been impossible for it to have coped with the same problem in the sixteenth century