The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

71. Central Intelligence Agency, The Rote Kapelle; Milligan, “Spies, Ciphers and ‘Zitadelle’”; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 285-9.

72. Glantz, Soviet Military Intelligence in War; Jukes, “The Soviets and ‘Ultra’”; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 289.

73. Beevor, Stalingrad, pp. 166-75, 201.

74. Under lend-lease agreements with Britain and the United States in 1941, the Soviet Union was supplied with 35,000 radio stations, 380,000 field telephones and 956,000 miles of telephone cable. Overy, Russia’s War, pp. 193-4.

75. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 315-20; Milligan, “Spies, Ciphers and ‘Zitadelle.’”

76. Kahn, “Soviet Comint in the Cold War,” p. 14.

Chapter Seven The Grand Alliance

1. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 241-2. At least in the early 1930s, the Fourth Department was probably primarily interested in the United States as a base from which to collect intelligence on Germany and Japan. Mitrokhin did not have access to Fourth Department files on its American agents and did not note references to these agents in KGB files. The case against Hiss, which has been strong but controversial ever since his conviction for perjury in 1951, is now overwhelming as a result of new evidence revealed during the 1990s from the VENONA decrypts, KGB files made available to Weinstein and Vassiliev which refer to his work for military intelligence, and Hungarian interrogation records of Hiss’s fellow agent Noel Field. These sources also do much to vindicate the credibility of Hiss’s principal public accuser, the former Fourth Department courier Whittaker Chambers. The best accounts of the Hiss case are the 1997 updated edition of Weinstein, Perjury, and Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, chs. 2, 12.

2. Wadleigh, “Why I Spied for the Communists,” part 7, New York Post (July 19, 1949).

3. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2; vol. 6, ch. 8, part 1, n. 2.

4. Massing, This Deception, p. 155. The fact that Massing defected from the NKVD in 1938 makes her tribute to Bazarov all the more impressive.

5. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

6. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

7. The details in Mitrokhin’s notes on “19” (date of birth, work in the Latin American division of the State Department, later transfer to the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) clearly identify him as Duggan; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. By 1943, at the latest, however, Duggan’s codename had been changed to FRENK (or FRANK); VENONA, 2nd release, pp. 278-9.

8. Weinstein, Perjury, pp. 182-3.

9. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

10. See above, p. 84.

11. Straight, After Long Silence, pp. 110, 122-3, 129-36; Newton, The Butcher’s Embrace, pp. 20-2.

12. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 240-3, 290. On Whittaker Chambers, see his memoir, Witness, and the biography by Sam Tanenhaus, Whittaker Chambers.

13. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

14. Others recalled from the United States to be interrogated and liquidated in Moscow included the illegal CHARLIE, whose file was destroyed and whose identity is now unknown. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, pp. 180-1.

15. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. Significantly, material on Morozov’s denunciation of two successive residents was among that excluded from the documents selected by the SVR for the recent study of Soviet espionage in the United States in the Stalin era by Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood. While obliged to acknowledge the purge of many loyal foreign intelligence officers, the SVR is generally reluctant to reveal cases where they were denounced by their own comrades. Despite such examples of SVR censorship, for which Weinstein and Vassiliev are not, of course, responsible, The Haunted Wood is a very valuable contribution to the history of Soviet intelligence operations.

16. It is unclear from Mitrokhin’s notes whether or not Akhmerov was given charge of an independent illegal residency before Bazarov’s recall. However, Hede Massing’s memoirs strongly suggest that both Bazarov and Akhmerov were members of the same illegal residency until at least 1937. Massing, This Deception, pp. 187-8, 191.

17. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 1. Significantly, the list of names noted by Mitrokhin did not include Samuel Dickstein, a Democratic congressman from Manhattan (codenamed CROOK), who had volunteered his services to the NKVD in 1937 but demanded a high price for his intelligence. Over the next two years, the NKVD oscillated between pride at having an agent in Congress and suspicion that Dickstein was recycling publicly available information. In June 1939 Ovakimyan denounced him in a message to the Center as “a complete racketeer and blackmailer.” Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, ch. 7.