The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

These statistics were compiled by the Second Department of FCD Directorate T, which was responsible for Line X operations in the residencies listed above. The figures for the Bonn residency account for only a part of Line X operations in the FRG; Line X operations were also run from Cologne. Line X in Karlshorst, which came under a different department of Directorate T, had fifty-nine agents in 1975 (k-5, 416). A probable majority of Line X operations in Vienna (which Mitrokhin’s notes do not make it possible to quantify) were directed at non-Austrian targets.

113. k-5, 383, 386, 406. Though Mitrokhin’s notes give no later statistics, it is possible that the 1977 record was subsequently surpassed.

114. Mitrokhin’s notes give the following incomplete statistics of Line X officers stationed in European residencies for all or part of the period 1974-9:

Belgrade 4 Berne 6 Bonn 9 Brussels 10 Cologne 13 Copenhagen 13 Geneva 7 The Hague 6 Helsinki 10 Lisbon ? London ? Oslo ? Paris 36 Rome 17 Stockholm 19 Vienna 38 (k-5, 459)

115. Line X in Paris also succeeded in penetrating an unquantifiable number of US companies and subsidiaries in France.

116. k-5, 460.

117. Though Mitrokhin’s note merely records that Andropov recommended the award of the Order of the Red Star, it is barely conceivable that the recommendation was turned down. Kesarev’s assistant, Yuri Ignatyevich Rakovsky, was recommended for accelerated promotion. k-5, 470.

118. Mitrokhin noted the following payments to ALAN which were recorded in his file: 409,000 francs for the period 1973 to 1976 (probably his basic salary with additional sums for particular items); 100,000 francs (undated) for information on the design of infra-red detectors; 40,000 francs (also undated) for samples of the detectors; 50,000 francs in September 1973 for two samples of missileguidance systems; payments of 71,000 and 100,000 francs in 1974 for technical documentation; 40,000 francs in 1974 or 1975 for unidentified technical samples; 89,400 francs (purpose unspecified) in 1975; 110,000 francs in 1977 for documentation on missile guidance; 60,000 francs and approximately 200,000 francs (30,000 convertible roubles) in December 1977 (purpose unspecified); and 200,000 francs (purpose unspecified) in mid-1978. On the assumptions that these were all separate sums and that there were no other payments unrecorded by Mitrokhin, this would make a grand total of 1,429,400 francs. k-5, 460.

119. k-5, 460.

120. Favier and Martin-Roland, La décennie Mitterrand, vol. 1, p. 97.

121. Bourdiol was arrested in 1983 and later sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, as a result of intelligence provided by the French agent FAREWELL. Wolton, Le KGB en France, p. 245; “Ariane: un ingénieur français incarcéré pour l’espionage,” Libération, (December 2, 1983); Early Warning (March 2, 1984); Reuter reports (June 16, 1987). There is no identifiable reference to Bourdiol in Mitrokhin’s notes.

122. Mitrokhin’s incomplete notes on payments to KARL record that from January to November 1979 he was paid a monthly salary of 13,200 francs and an additional sum of 32,000 francs; and that from January to October he was paid 12,000 francs a month plus a single payment of 34,000 francs. KARL worked as a KGB agent from 1972 to 1982. k-5, 367-9.

123. k-5, 367.

124. On the FAREWELL case, see Wolton, Le KGB en France, part 5, and Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, ch. 17. FAREWELL was first identified as Vetrov in Andrew and Gordievsky, Le KGB dans le monde, pp. 619-23.

125. Raymond Nart, head of the DST Soviet section, writing under the pseudonym Henri Regnard, gave the first public account of what had been learned from the FAREWELL operation in December 1983 in an article published in the journal Défense Nationale.

126. President Mitterrand, whose mind turned naturally to conspiracy, subsequently began to suspect bizarrely that the FAREWELL information might somehow have been planted on the DST by the CIA “as a way of testing socialist France and me personally,” in order to see whether he would hold it back or pass it on to the Reagan administration. Favier and Martin-Roland, La décennie Mitterrand, vol. 1, pp. 94-8, 271-3.

127. Mitrokhin’s notes contain the following comparative figures for the numbers of agents run by KGB residencies controlled by the FCD Fifth Department:

On January 1, 1975 the Rome residency had 23 agents (18 of them active) and 6 confidential contacts, as well as 4 agents in the Soviet community. A year later it had 21 non-Soviet agents (16 active), 7 confidential contacts and 9 Soviet agents (k-13, 135).

128. See above, chapter 17.

129. See above, chapter 17.