The Thinking Reed

Of course this ‘new samizdat’ co-exists with other publications whose stance is based on the traditions of 1970s dissidence. The magazine Glasnost', edited by Sergei Grigoryants, is well known in the West. In Moscow and Leningrad, however, this journal is constantly subjected to harsh criticism, and not just from the authorities. Grigoryants is accused of thinking more about reception abroad than about his readers within the country. It is also contended that the magazine’s published material is often of doubtful accuracy. Greater authority is enjoyed by Express-Chronicle, another publication which attempts to continue the traditions of ‘classical samizdat’ of the 1970s, though it too is accused of aiming at ‘export only’.

The main problem for the samizdat press, whatever its political or cultural orientation, is how to forge a relationship with official publications in a period of liberalization. If traditional samizdat (the heirs of which are Glasnost' and Express-Chronicle) tried to become an alternative to the official press, then the new samizdat is striving to co-exist and cooperate with it. Copies of Mercury and other leftist publications can be found in the editorial offices of ‘real’ papers. And when Yelena Zelinskaya organized a meeting in Leningrad of the editors of samizdat magazines, it received official sanction. Representatives of practically all the unofficial publications except Glasnost' were invited to the meeting, and correspondents from Literaturnaya Gazeta and Izvestiya, the Novosti Press Agency and other organs of the state press were also present. Not a single one of these official organs ran a report on the meeting, but the very fact of the presence in Leningrad of representatives of the ‘mainstream Soviet press’ is very significant.

What also became clear at the Leningrad meeting was that there are not one but three different samizdats in the country. But the literary avant-garde, the traditional dissidents and the ‘new Left’ hardly argued — they could not find any common subjects for discussion. Some were discussing ‘freedom from the government and the nation’, others were talking about ‘the unreformability of Communism’, while others were trying to work out a concept of a ‘social movement for structural reforms’.

It seems that the change in the political situation has created no fewer (though possibly more) problems for samizdat than for the official press. Attempts by certain samizdat publications to compete with official newspapers in the area of ‘the criticism of individual shortcomings’ will get nowhere. More and more subjects are being opened up for discussion, and it is very much easier for the correspondents of state newspapers to gather information than it is for the editors of samizdat bulletins.

It is clear, however, that even with liberalization the independent small-circulation publications cannot be squeezed out by the state. This is not just a question of degrees of radicalism and sharpness of criticism. The very same writers (myself included) sometimes consider the same questions in both samizdat and official publications.

Soviet society’s real need for samizdat does not arise only because of the continuing ‘shortage of glasnost'’ in various areas. Thanks to their independence, samizdat journals can follow a consistent editorial line without glancing over their shoulders at the establishment’s view. The movement of the Soviet new Left could not have developed without the existence of its own information and discussion bulletins. In short, samizdat is beginning to function in the same way as small-scale radical publications in the West. In addition, for writers and poets the existence of samizdat (and the relatively tolerant attitude of the authorities) gives increased freedom of choice. Things which cannot get into the mainstream press can be disseminated by the independent publications.

Both the revived state press and samizdat are contributing to the creation of a civil society in the Soviet Union. The question is how stable and long-term these tendencies will be, and to what extent the growing social movement will be able to exert real influence on how the situation develops. This depends not only on the stance taken by the authorities, but also on the degree in which progressive elements — in journals and in the clubs — take advantage of the opportunities which glasnost' has opened up to them.

Note

3 Manifesto for Change

Meeting of Informal Associations in Moscow, 20 August 1987: Summary of Boris Kagarlitsky’s Speech1

Comrades,