It is important that this was mentioned as an example; Stalin did not ascribe any special qualities to the Russian language; these were simply assumed. This is, in general, a notable feature of the statocratic ideology: the main thing lies between the lines; the main thing is not said, only implied. But the significance of such ‘slips of the tongue’ at the beginning of the 1950s can hardly be overestimated. ‘In this way,’ as the Austrian Scharndorf observes, ‘Great-Russian chauvinism received its theoretical foundation.’12
The Soviet statocracy, born of the Bolshevik Revolution, had hitherto concealed its nationalism behind ‘internationalist’ phraseology. After the war the ideological situation changed. ‘From defence,’ writes Boffa, ‘nationalism went over to the offensive.’13The 1940s saw an intensive rethinking of history on Russian nationalist lines. As an example we may take
All the peoples of the USSR had to acknowledge that they were ‘younger brothers’ of the Russians, although some of them (for example, the Tadzhiks and the Armenians) went back a thousand years earlier. It was suddenly discovered that the cultural traditions of all the peoples of our country had been linked with Russia long before the conquest of these peoples by the Muscovite Tsars and that everything that was best (!) in their history and culture was due to the Russians. Thus, for example, in Tadzhikistan in the 1950s a certain Radzhabov specialized in working up this idea. Firdousi’s poetry would never have been written, according to him, had the poet not been influenced by… Kiev Rus. Through provincial backwardness this sort of ‘research’ continued in some places even after Stalin’s death.17