The Third World War: August 1985

The President of the United States, terribly aware of his unique responsibilities, was reluctant to raise the temperature. He got through on the hot-line to the head of government in the USSR (with some delay — it was several hours before the Soviet President could be brought to the instrument) to make emphatic remonstrance and to urge the cancellation of all further warlike preparations. Surprise was expressed in response to such concern. What was happening in the GDR was only an exercise, of which appropriate notice had been given. Practice mobilizations — carried out only rarely because of the cost — were indispensable to the efficiency of armed forces. When this one was over it would not need to be repeated for a long time. It was hoped that the President of the United States would not encourage panic reaction. The best service to the cause of world peace would be to quieten the manic howls of fascist revanchists in West Germany. These were increasing daily and causing growing concern in the USSR.

Under mounting pressure from the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with clear indications that public opinion was moving strongly in favour of mobilization, the President gave the order on 21 July. The Federal Republic had begun its own mobilization the day before. The United Kingdom did not follow until the 23rd, and even then with some reluctance. It was not at first clear whether the trade unions — no longer the dominant force in the governance of Britain they had been in the seventies, but still powerful — would co-operate. There was the expected chorus of left-wing disapproval; a good deal of hard bargaining and wheedling was needed before the go-ahead could be given. Even then only a modified form of mobilization was ordered in the first instance. Parliament, hastily recalled from recess, quickly passed a short enabling Act to make possible certain preparations (such as the embodiment of voluntary reserves) constitutionally dependent on full mobilization. The reserves began to be called up.

Following an emergency meeting of the NATO Council, mobilization in every other member state of the organization was ordered at about the same time. It had long been a structural flaw in NATO, becoming increasingly apparent in the seventies, that there was no general agreement on the timing of response to alert measures by individual governments. Each retained a high, if varying, degree of discretion. It was fortunate that there was now too little cause for doubt to permit procrastination.

The position of France was uncertain. Though still a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty she had not been for some twenty years a member of the military organization. Her Popular Front government was unlikely to welcome the possibility of hostilities with the Soviet Union. SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) tried in vain to discover what orders would be given, in the event of hostilities, to II French Corps in south-west Germany. At least, with reservists being recalled in France, deficiencies in personnel and equipment were being made good here, as they were elsewhere, while the relations between the French command and staff in Germany on the one hand and CENTAG on the other continued to be close. Elsewhere, Switzerland, Sweden and Austria were also recalling reservists and bringing their forces to a higher state of readiness.

Almost as difficult for the Americans and British, and for the Canadians too, as the decision to mobilize was the question of whether to order the repatriation of dependants of service personnel in Germany, and other civilian nationals, and, if this was to be done, when to do it. This had always been seen as a critical indicator of whether hostilities were expected. London and Washington both gave forty-eight hours’ notice of evacuation on 23 July. Movement of civilian nationals began on the 25th — in part directly by air to their home countries, in part by road, in the first instance to staging areas, in Holland for the British and in Belgium for the Americans and Canadians. Evacuation was everywhere complete by the 30th.

Meanwhile, throughout the whole European theatre NATO formations were on the move to their operational positions. The headquarters at their different levels — of CENTAG with its American commander at Heidelberg, of NORTHAG under British command at Rheindahlen, of AFCENT with its German commanding general at Brunssum in Holland, and of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe), with its American Supreme Commander (SACEUR) and his British and German deputies, itself at Mons in Belgium — were all due to move to war locations, with staggered timings, in the next few days. Advance parties had manned these locations already and tested communications.