The Third World War: The Untold Story

Support for Iran — the third policy requirement — did not take the form of troops or arms, but rather guarantees of co-operation in frontier control, shipping protection in the Gulf and economic aid. Iran was thus able to enhance its internal prosperity and external security without fear of threat from any of its western neighbours. The greatest threat to Iran would be from the north. The need to remove this threat was one of the reasons that brought war to the Middle East. The other was control of the sea.

Those who had previously been sceptical about the effectiveness or even the employability of the United States Rapid Deployment Force, with possible contingents from Great Britain, France and Italy, were agreeably surprised by both the rapidity of its deployment and its strength. The United States battle group in the Indian Ocean, despite torpedo damage to the carrier Nimitz, succeeded in neutralizing the Soviet squadron. The United States air reinforcement of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, together with the best part of an airborne division that landed near Cairo, gave them the capability of countering any Soviet intervention overland. The joint naval force of British and French frigates, plus a US Marine amphibious force and embarked air wing, secured the Gulf. The Arab four-point strategic policy, desirable in concept, had now been accomplished.

Removal of the threat to Iran from the north was the work, not of the Western allies or of the Arab nations, or even of the Iranians themselves. It was the work of the Afghan guerrilla movement. The substantial re-arming programme that had been in progress since 1982 reached its height in 1985. By this time there were plenty of essential weapons and ammunition, including SAM-7 launchers (which were extremely effective against helicopter gunships), machine-guns, mortars, assault rifles and anti-tank guided missiles. Even more important was the degree of central command and control exercised by the guerrillas' formidable and respected leader whose main area of operations was in the provinces of Nangarhar and Paktiar. His great chance came when the Soviet Union began to withdraw some of its armoured and helicopter formations from Afghanistan after the outbreak of hostilities on the Central Front in Europe. Allowing the first contingents of these powerful armoured and mechanized forces to retire unmolested, he chose his moment, declared jihad and supervised a concerted attack on every Soviet unit left in Afghanistan.

In 1842 the British Army had suffered a 'signal catastrophe' when it retreated from Kabul. There had been but one survivor, Surgeon Brydon, who succeeded in reaching Jalalabad. Rudyard Kipling had had some unpleasant things to say about what happened to British soldiers if they were wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains — 'an' the women come out to cut up what remains' — but neither of these points applied to the Soviet catastrophe. There were no wounded for the women to cut up. There were no survivors. The Soviet Union, during the remaining short period when it existed under that name, made no attempt to re-enter Afghanistan or to interfere in Iran.

One of the most satisfactory features of the peace conference in Geneva, which continued on and off for the whole of 1986, was the expedition with which the former Middle East peace treaties were reconsidered and signed. The United States was at once able to enforce Israel's compliance and help to guarantee its right to exist. The guarantors were now the United Nations themselves with the United States and the Arab nations foremost among them. The essential conditions for peace had been realized. Jerusalem had become a symbol of unified freedom, the Palestinians were autonomous and had their own chosen constitution and Israel was secure. Harmony between most of the Arab nations had been achieved.

It has been argued that just as peace in Arabia was dependent upon a settlement in Palestine, so peace in Africa was dependent upon a settlement in Namibia. If peace in the Middle East promises to be lasting, it is perhaps because it sprang from confrontation which led to negotiation. If peace in Africa, particularly southern Africa — to which we must now turn our attention — appears to be less durable, it is perhaps because it is the result of negotiation which can only lead to further confrontation.

Chapter 18: Southern Africa