In the Middle East the central issue of Palestine had been tackled and resolved. In Africa the central problem of what to do about South Africa had not really been tackled at all, still less resolved. This was not the only contrast between the two areas. In the Middle East the goal of a peaceful settlement for Palestine and Jerusalem had commanded the support of nearly all neighbouring nations and had more or less unified the Arab countries themselves. No such accord was to be found in southern Africa. There the problem was not how to create an autonomous state from peoples and territory that had been overrun and occupied as a result of war. The problem was how to persuade a sovereign independent state of great economic and military strength to change its political system to the immediate disadvantage of those whose system it was and who enjoyed the fruits of its power and privilege.
A generally declared commitment on the part of the black frontline nations that majority rule must replace apartheid was all very well in principle. But it seemed to endorse Bismarck's celebrated ^observation that when you say that you agree to a thing in principle, you mean that you have not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice. In practice there appeared to be no effective means by which these front-line states or the Organization for African Unity (OAU) or any other body could induce South Africa to change its system and its policy. Moreover, the priorities pursued by the black nations were, understandably enough, to provide themselves with some degree of economic prosperity and political security. Yet in the early 1980s there had been one or two encouraging signs. One was in Namibia, another in South Africa itself.
We can perhaps look back four years with satisfaction at the emergence of an independent Namibia in 1983, when the great difficulty of reconciling the contradictory positions of South Africa on the one hand and the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) on the other had at length been overcome by the tireless efforts of five Western powers — Britain, the United States, Canada, France, and West Germany — known as the Western group. It will be remembered that UN Security Council Resolution 435 had in plain terms proposed a ceasefire that would be controlled by a United Nations force, followed by elections, also to be UN supervised, and then a proclamation of independence. South Africa's particular objection to this plan lay in what appeared to be general acceptance by most other African states and the UN as a whole that SWAPO was the sole representative of the Namibian people. In those circumstances the impartiality of the UN observers and supervisors could hardly, so South Africa claimed, be guaranteed. And if SWAPO was by such lack of impartiality to win a sweeping majority in the elections, what was to prevent it establishing a one-party socialist — in South African eyes, communist — state and so put southern Africa on the road to international communism? SWAPO itself favoured Resolution 435 proposals simply because of the freedom of intimidation that it might allow it and the consequent freedom for constitutional adjustments which a substantial victory would then give it. To bridge the gap between these two positions and to secure the confidence of the Namibian internal political parties, as well as of SWAPO, South Africa and the other African nations, the Western group presented their alternative plan in the latter part of 1981.
No proposal could have been equally liked by all parties concerned, but the new plan commanded sufficient support among those who were in a position to influence the waverers that it formed the basis for implementing Resolution 435. In essence this new plan was that the ceasefire would be followed by elections to a constituent assembly; this assembly would then be required to pass by a two-thirds majority a constitution; an election under the constitution would in turn open the way for independence itself. The system of government under the proposed constitution was to have three branches: an elected executive branch responsible to the legislature; a legislature elected by universal suffrage; and an independent judicial branch. The electoral system, being based on membership from both the constituencies and the parties, would ensure proper representation in the legislature to the various political groups among the Namibian people throughout the country. The constitution was also to contain a declaration of fundamental rights to guarantee personal, political and racial freedom.