Tiger Heat: German Panzers on the Eastern Front

At least they would be safer here. Air attacks were common, but there were two flak batteries complete with quadruple 20mm anti-aircraft cannon guarding the sky and several anti-tank guns stationed around the village. A counter attack was expected. The German infantry had been getting dug in and preparing their own defences in preparation for an attack. Very little tank fighting occurred at night, since tanks could not effectively engage targets at ranges much beyond 100 yards unless flares were fired, but this tended to aid the defender more than the attacker, revealing enemy positions.

CHAPTER FIVE – Overview

Hitler hated the Communist ideology and his intention was to crush the Soviet Union. He already had battle prepared and tested panzer divisions along with the mighty Luftwaffe to offer air support. His plan was to use armoured spearheads to penetrate deep into Russian and destroy the Russian Army. Hitler saw Operation Barbarossa as a crusade to not only destroy the Red Army and Soviet state, but at the eventual obliteration of the indigenous Slavic populations as a necessary precursor to German colonization in the East.

The war in the East would see an offensive planned on an almost ad-hoc or making tactical decisions based on opportunity. This was very different to the campaigns in France, Poland and the Balkans. Hitler made three assumptions, the first being that the Soviet campaign would be a short campaign lasting only a few months. The second was that the Soviet terrain and climate would not have a significant impact on the operation. The third was that the Red Army could be swiftly destroyed – maybe taking around six weeks with a fast moving campaign.

Hitler had not taken into account what would happen if the operation lasted longer than intended. The production of tanks and training of new tank crews to replace battle losses. The stockpiling of fuel and ammunition to keep the panzer forces moving. He had just assumed the flat terrain of the Soviet Union would aid the fast progress of the panzer divisions across Russia. The dense forests, poor roads, plethora of rivers and vast distances had not been factored in. He had also underestimated the Red Army’s ability and fighting spirit. Each one of these factors would conspire against the German’s and lead to their eventual defeat allowing the Red Army to repel the attacking force all the way back to Germany before marching into Berlin.

Stalin knew he had to deter any German attacks until the Red Army was ready to take on the German’s on a more even footing. The Red Army’s tanks corps had been disbanded in November 1939 only to be re-formed and double in size after the German victory in France. These corps would be equipped with the new KV-1 and T-34 tanks to replace the T-26 and BT series tanks. Over 5,000 of these new tanks were ordered and had to be ready to fully equip the Tank corps by mid-1942. However, Stalin realized the Germans were expanding their panzer divisions and wanted another 11,000 tanks to be produced and form an even larger Tank corps as quickly as possible. With plants operating at fully capacity this was unlikely to be met by late 1943. The reorganization and expansion of the Tank Corps led to disarray in June 1941.

Stalin like Hitler had made three assumptions. The first being that adequate warning of an impending German assault. Giving the Red Army time to prepare and deploy. The red Army also assumed it could hold its own against the Germans with adequate training, logistics and preparation. The third Soviet strategic assumption was that industrial mobilization was the key to victory and that campaigns would be decided by the side that had the greater ability to sustain its forces in protracted operations, not by fancy manoeuvres. Stalin’s misunderstanding meant the first assumption undermined the second assumption. This error led to the destruction of most of the pre-war tank force within the first three months of the German assault. However, unlike Hitler the third assumption did come to fruition and in turn enabled the second assumption to come to fruition. In this sense, Stalin and the Red Army ended up in a better tactical position. The Soviet numerical superiority acted as a counterweight to the superior panzer tactics.

Hitler had deployed four panzer groups for a total of seventeen panzer divisions and 3,106 tanks for Operation Barbarossa. In addition, two independent panzer battalions, Pz.Abt. 40 and Pz.Abt. 211, were deployed in Finland with 124 tanks (incl. twenty Pz.III). The 2 and 5. Panzer-Division were refitting in Germany after the Greek Campaign in April 1941 and were in reserve. Germany was in essence committing all of its Panzer divisions to Operation Barborossa. By mid-1941 the Germans were producing around 250 tanks a week.