Tiger Heat: German Panzers on the Eastern Front

The Red Army by June 1941 would deploy 9,500 tanks. The Germans based their assumptions and put together a handbook about Soviet tanks for the panzer groups, which described the various models of the T-26, T-28, T-35 and BT-5/ 7 in detail. The handbook also included information about a new Soviet heavy tank equipped with 60mm-thick armour and 76.2mm main armament that had been used against the Finns in December 1939; this was the SMK prototype, which the Germans mistakenly labelled as the T-35C. What was not fully realised was the existence of the KV-1, also trialled at the same time as the SMK. Only one SMK was ever made as it proved to not be a very good design after being used in the War in Finland. Although Kinzel was aware that the Soviets had fielded a prototype heavy tank eighteen months prior to Barbarossa. He felt though that existing anti-tank weapons would be able to defeat it.

Another issue was that German planners had no appreciation for the Soviet military philosophy of echeloned attack and defence, which meant that defeating the Red Army in a single campaign would prove far more difficult than the French Army in 1940. The entire essence of the so-called Blitzkrieg was to use concentrated armoured formations in short, powerful jabs to dislocate an enemy’s defence by isolating their best forces.

This would lead to the surrender of the forces cut off and surrounded. However, Stalin and his Red Army had no intention of surrendering. Especially when they realised Hitler wanted to exterminate them. They may as well fight to the death rather than become POWs and be killed any way. This so called ‘war of annihilation’ made it impossible for Hitler and his Wehrmacht to succeed against the Red Army. This was without factoring the harsh weather and terrain that the Germans had not foreseen or even planned for. The Red Army had already learnt these painful lessons about the limitations of mechanized units in forested terrain and winter conditions during the 1939–40 Russo-Finnish War. Another larger area that the Germans left unconsidered was the crossing the mass of Rivers in the Soviet Union. Although, the German had some amphibious tanks to aid in getting across rivers. However, the bridging capabilities of the 1941–42 panzer divisions were rather rudimentary –a Brüfckenkolonne B or K could construct a 50-meter long pontoon bridge in about twelve hours that could just support a Pz.III medium tank, but the Pz.IV and later Tiger and Panthers needed proper bridges to get across significant water obstacles. The Germans lagged behind the Allies in assault bridging, having nothing like the British Bailey bridge. When bridges or fording sites were not available, armoured operations came to a full stop.

CHAPTER SIX – Eastern Front

During the war on the Eastern Front both sides tended to claim every enemy tank hit as a ‘kill’, but a good percentage of hits either bounced off the armour or failed to penetrate. Based upon post-battle analysis of both sides’ records, the Germans appeared to have on many occasions exaggerated their tank ‘kills’ by up to 200 per cent and the Soviets by 500 per cent. Tanks are complex weapon systems that require several sub-systems and the crew to function properly in order to provide the vehicle with its key characteristics: firepower, protection, mobility and communications. Tank crews vary in size, with 4–5 being the normal size for a full-strength crew. Combat and noncombat casualties along with disease and sickness in winter months could reduce crews both in size and fighting ability. This was true of either a German or Red Army crew. It was essential that each member of the crew performed their designated task to the best of their ability for the tank to achieve its full capability. A poorly-trained loader might be the lowest man in the tank crew hierarchy, but his inability to reload main gun rounds quickly in combat could easily lead to his tank losing a gunnery duel against a faster opponent. The tank driver’s ability to manoeuvre over rough terrain and use cover and concealed approaches is critical for the crew’s survival. The driver needed to fully understand the tanks limits on different kinds of terrain.

Here is a diary extract from Unteroffizier Erich Hager, a Panzer IV driver in the 6 Panzer Regiment 39. This extract records his actions not far from Venev on the Eastern Front: