War And Peace

But even if we assume that Alexander I, fifty years ago,⁸ was mistaken in his view of what was good for the various peoples, we must also assume that the historian censuring Alexander will with the passage of time also prove to be wrong in his view of what constitutes the good of humanity. Such a claim seems normal and inescapable when we look at the course of history and note that with each passing year and each new writer the view of what constitutes the good of humanity tends to change, and something that seemed good ten years ago now seems bad, and vice versa. To make matters worse, we discover that in history there are sometimes contemporaries who hold opposing views about what is good and what is bad. The granting of a constitution to Poland and the Holy Alliance are seen by some people as redounding to Alexander’s credit, by others to his shame.

When discussing the actions of Alexander and Napoleon we cannot claim them as good or bad, because we cannot say what makes them good or bad. If their actions happen not to appeal to someone, the lack of appeal comes from nothing more than a disparity between the activities themselves and a narrow view of what constitutes the good of humanity. Even if I take a positive view of the survival of my father’s house in Moscow in 1812, or the glory of the Russian army, or the success of Petersburg University and other universities, or the independence of Poland, or the supremacy of Russia, or the balance of power in Europe, or a particular development in European enlightenment that goes by the name of progress, I am bound to admit that the activity of any historical figure was aimed at more than these things, at more generalized goals beyond my comprehension.

But let us suppose that ‘science’ has the power of reconciling all contradictions, and can judge historical figures and events according to a fixed standard of goodness and badness.

Let us suppose that Alexander could have done everything differently. Let us assume that he could have been guided by those who now censure him and confidently claim to know the ultimate goal of the movement of humanity, and could have followed the programme of nationalism, freedom, equality and progress (these seem to cover the ground) that today’s critics would have selected for him. Let us suppose that this programme, once found to be feasible, might have been feasible and actually implemented by Alexander. Then what would have happened to everything that was done by those who opposed the policies of the government of the day and indulged in activities that were, according to the same historians, good and beneficial? There would have been no such activities, there would have been no life, there would have been nothing.

Once you allow that human life is subject to reason you extinguish any possibility of life.

CHAPTER 2

If we assume, as historians do, that great men lead humanity towards the achievement of certain goals, such as the supremacy of Russia or France, the balance of power in Europe, the dissemination of ideas stemming from the Revolution, general progress, or anything you fancy, it becomes impossible to explain the phenomena of history without having recourse to concepts like chance and genius.

If the object of the European wars at the beginning of this century had been the aggrandizement of Russia, this object could have been attained without any of the preceding wars, and without the need for invasion. If the object had been the aggrandizement of France, this object might have been attained without the need for Revolution or empire. If the object had been the dissemination of ideas, the printing of books would have attained that object much more efficiently than soldiers. If the object had been the advancement of civilization, we can safely assume there are other more expedient ways of diffusing civilized values than slaughtering men and destroying their property.

So why did things happen this way and not otherwise? Because this is how they happened. ‘Chance set up the situation; genius exploited it,’ history tells us.

But what is chance? What is genius?

The words chance and genius denote nothing that actually exists, and therefore they cannot be defined. All they denote is a degree of attainment in the understanding of phenomena. I don’t know why a certain phenomenon occurs, I believe I never can know why, so I end up not wanting to know and I talk about chance. I observe a force producing an effect out of all proportion to the general run of human quality; I don’t understand why this happens, so I talk about genius.