Where the Iron Crosses Grow

However, the seizure of the Crimea was only the first step in unleashing a new confrontation between East and West that is likely to persist for many years. Now, in the second decade of the 21st century, we are witness to another confrontation at the Perekop Isthmus and Chongar Narrows, with Russian troops on one side and Ukrainian troops on the other. Suddenly, in the era of the Internet and GPS-guided bombs, an 18th century ditch dug by Crimean Tatars is again a relevant military feature. Once again, the Perekop Isthmus is mined and troops are on guard against a sudden assault. History is truly odd at times. Ukraine’s leaders are resolved to regain the Crimea some day, and the West refuses to recognize this Russian land-grab, which sets the stage for a future East–West crisis, with the Crimea at the center of the storm.

Putin openly violated the Budapest Memorandum and risked a confrontation with the West in order to regain control over the Crimea and to ensure a future for the Black Sea Fleet. However, in order to make the Black Sea Fleet really viable, Russia will have to reclaim the shipbuilding facilities in Nikolayev and Odessa, as well as direct land access to the Crimea through the Nogai Steppe – something that would cause the collapse of an independent Ukrainian state. Consequently, the occupation of the Crimea was only a half-measure, and Putin is now intent upon dismembering Ukraine by any means necessary, which can lead only to conflict and bloodshed at some point. NATO is hardly likely to acquiesce to large-scale land grabs or the destruction of independent states, and the consequences may be very unpalatable for Russia in the long term. Poland will likely arm itself to the teeth, and Germany – if it sees no clear US commitment to prevent further Russian aggression – may also embark upon serious rearmament, including acquisition of a nuclear deterrent. A NATO that was nearly superfluous at the dawn of the 21st century has been given a new lease on life, thanks to Putin’s decisions in the Crimea. A new Cold War beckons, and all hopes for greater East–West cooperation now lie dashed to pieces.

Despite the fact that competing efforts to gain control over the Crimea have yielded negligible strategic benefit to anyone for the past century, the idea that owning the Crimea is worth shedding copious amounts of blood and oppressing others for is going to retain ideological saliency for some time. Putin has learned nothing from the tragic history of the Crimea from 1917–45, and appears poised to repeat the mistakes of his predecessors. Amazingly, the Crimea is going to remain as a cockpit of war, with ancient fortifications refurbished and pressed back into service so that new generations of heroes can be asked to make sacrifices for an arid peninsula that has consistently proven to be an empty prize.

Appendices

Appendix A: Dramatis personae

Colonel Pavel P. Gorpishchenko (1893–1943). Commander of the 8th Naval Infantry Brigade at Sevastopol until seriously wounded in June 1942. He was evacuated and later commanded the 77th Rifle Division until killed at the Nikopol bridgehead on November 28, 1943. Gorpishchenko is now widely regarded as one of the great Soviet heroes of the 1941–42 Siege of Sevastopol, and his reputation did not suffer like other commanders, who abandoned their units when the city fell.

Captain Lieutenant Aleksei P. Matyukhin (1912–45). Commander of Battery 701 on the Malakhov Hill, who survived three years of captivity in the Gross-Rosen Concentration Camp until he was liberated at the end of the war. However the NKVD interrogated all former POWs and Matyukhin received a very rough welcome. He committed suicide in August 1945.

Aleksei V. Mokrousov (1887–1959). Soviet partisan leader in Crimea in 1941–42. After being relieved of command in mid-1942, he was given command of the 66th Guards Rifle Regiment and participated in the landings near Kerch in November 1943. After the liberation of the Crimea, he managed to get promoted to the rank of colonel but was quickly relegated to the reserves once the war ended. Post-war, Mokrousov used his connections with the Communist Party bosses in Simferopol to get himself a senior bureaucratic post. Given his hatred for the Crimean Tatars, he was likely one of the Communist officials who benefited from the appropriation of Tatar lands and property.