Where the Iron Crosses Grow

In contrast, the situation of Manstein’s AOK 11 was getting worse, rather than improving, due to the near-breakdown of Heeresgruppe Süd’s logistical infrastructure. Because of the Soviet demolition of all railroad bridges over the Dnepr – which would not be fully repaired until 1943 – no fuel trains could proceed east of the river. Instead, supplies had to be ferried across the Dnepr from the main railhead at Kherson and then either loaded onto the few captured Soviet trains available or moved 210 miles by the depleted number of trucks still operational in AOK 11’s quartermaster units. Heavy rains, which arrived in late November, turned the Crimea’s roads into slow-go terrain, further exacerbating the problem. Logistical priority went to ammunition, so by mid-December AOK 11’s forward divisions had stockpiled over 1,600 tons of artillery ammunition, but the soldiers in the forward positions were left shivering in their summer uniforms and with reduced rations. Gottlob Bidermann noted the poor quality of the rations that were available, and that he and his fellow Panzerjägers were forced to scavenge warm overcoats from the corpses of fallen Soviet naval infantrymen in front of their positions.⁹ German frontline morale was deteriorating with each passing day, and the cold weather would soon reduce Manstein’s half-strength infantry units to combat ineffectiveness. Under these conditions, Manstein probably would have preferred to conduct a siege until his army was strong enough to mount a full-scale assault on Sevastopol in the spring, but once the Soviet Winter Counteroffensive began in early December, Hitler became increasingly adamant that AOK 11 finish off Sevastopol as soon as possible in order to release its divisions for use elsewhere. Forced into action by events elsewhere on the front, Manstein decided to gamble and make another assault upon Sevastopol before Christmas.

There were a few bright notes that improved AOK 11’s chances. Since the arrival of the 24. Infanterie-Division at Sevastopol in late November and the imminent arrival of the 170. Infanterie-Division in late December, Manstein could potentially employ six German divisions against the fortress instead of less than three as in the previous effort. Furthermore, much of the heavy siege artillery employed at Ishun – which had been unavailable in November – had arrived at the front to support the December offensive. Zuckertort’s super-heavy artillery now included one 35.5cm M1 howitzer, four 30.5cm mortars, eight 24cm Model 39 howitzers, and 36 14.9cm s. FH 37(t) howitzers; except for the M1 built by Rheinmetall, all of the German super-heavy artillery had been taken from the defunct Czech Army in 1939. However, most of the super-heavy artillery pieces were shortrange, area-attack weapons with low rates of fire – they were intended to supplement and not replace division-level 10.5cm and 15cm batteries. One specific weakness of Zuckertort’s artillery, noted in the battle of Perekop, was a lack of long-range artillery for counterbattery work. Consequently, AOK 11 received two battalions (II./AR 54 and II./AR 818) equipped with 16 10.5cm s.K 18 cannon and the 6. Batterie from Artillerie-Lehr-Regiment 2 with four 15cm K18 cannon; these weapons could engage enemy artillery out to 13–15 miles and help to even the odds against Morgunov’s heavy coastal batteries. A second Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung had also arrived in the Crimea, doubling Hansen’s assault guns from 21 to 42.¹⁰

Because of the end of German offensive operations everywhere else, Fliegerkorps IV was also able to support AOK 11 with an additional bomber Gruppe, as well as more Stukas and fighters. However, even these additional reinforcements might have been enough, and Manstein opted to increase his vulnerabilities in quiet sectors in order to mass as much of AOK 11’s remaining strength into a powerful Schwerpunkt (main effort) that could breach Sevastopol’s defenses. As part of this risky strategy, he reduced Sponeck’s XXXXII Armeekorps holding the Kerch Peninsula to just the 46. Infanterie-Division and two Romanian brigades, assuming that the defeated Soviet 51st Army could not mount any attacks across the Kerch Straits in winter. He also decided to incorporate the Romanian 1st Mountain Brigade into his offensive plan, recognizing that he needed their numbers now.