Where the Iron Crosses Grow

South of Duvankoi and the Bel’bek River, the 132. and 24. Infanterie-Divisionen ripped the Soviet forward positions to pieces and advanced up to 2 miles in most sectors. I./IR 438, supported by four assault guns from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 197, punched through the 287th Rifle Regiment’s defenses and captured Hill 209.9, while III./IR 438 routed Major Ivan I. Kulagin’s 2nd Perekop Naval Infantry Regiment and forced it to retreat 2 miles. Hauptmann Wolfgang von Kranenbrock, commander of II./IR 102, sliced through the forward security of the 54th Rifle Regiment and captured Hill 247.1, a key piece of terrain north of the Mekenzievy Farm. Further south, two battalions from Oberst Kurt Versock’s IR 31 penetrated the 3rd Naval Infantry’s line west of Mekenzievy Farm and captured Hill 287.6. The 50. Infanterie-Division mounted a supporting attack with six battalions that also gained 1¼ miles, and Romanian mountain infantry made a successful attack in the Chernaya River valley. All along the line, the Soviet forward security units suffered heavy losses and were pushed back up to 2 miles. Hansen’s assault battalions had achieved surprise, and used the best tactics for the limited resources available, resulting in a significant German tactical victory on the first day of the offensive. However, victory did not come cheap; LIV Armeekorps suffered 1,698 casualties, including 356 dead or missing, on the first day, which was equivalent to about 11 percent of the assaulting troops.

Throughout the siege of Sevastopol, Petrov’s ability to exercise effective battle command was hindered by poor communications with his frontline units, which relied heavily upon wire and field telephones.¹¹ When units abandoned positions and retreated, the phones were often left behind, causing them to lose contact with their divisional headquarters. Few of Petrov’s units below division level had tactical radios. Consequently, the German advances on the first day caused great confusion, as one Soviet regiment after another retreated and lost contact. It was not until late in the day that Petrov began to find out how badly Vilshansky’s 8th NIB had been hurt, and of the loss of key terrain on the right flank of Sector IV. Once aware of the situation, Petrov committed the bulk of his reserves to restore the front line: Ovseenko’s 388th Rifle Division was ordered to send one regiment to help Zhidilov’s weakened 8th NIB in retaking Mount Aziz-Oba and the other two regiments to plug the hole caused by the retreat of the 2nd Perekop Naval Infantry Regiment. Petrov also committed the understrength 40th Cavalry Division to Sector IV and Zhidilov’s 7th NIB to retake the ground taken by the 24. and 50. Infanterie-Divisionen. Amazingly, Petrov had committed virtually his entire reserve in the first 24 hours of the enemy offensive, leaving only the 161st Rifle Regiment from the 95th Rifle Division in reserve.

Yet even as Petrov’s reserves were moving into the front line, Wolff’s 22. Infanterie-Division renewed its offensive at dawn on November 18. Zuckertort’s gunners began by firing another 10,800 rounds of ammunition in support. Oberst Ernst Haccius’s IR 65 had two battalions atop Mount Aziz-Oba, which spotted three battalions of Vilshansky’s 8th NIB and the 40th Cavalry Division assembling for their own counterattack to retake the hill. Haccius’s soldiers were outnumbered and tired, but from the high ground his MG 34 teams were able to viciously rake the Soviet infantry below. The two German battalions then attacked downhill and caught the Soviet troops completely flat-footed, routing them. All three of Vilshansky’s battalions were wrecked as fighting units. Oberst Dietrich von Choltitz’s IR 16 enjoyed even greater success against the 773rd Rifle Regiment, moving up to try and restore the ruptured right flank of Sector IV. First calling in a punishing artillery barrage to disrupt the Soviet regiment, Choltitz then attacked with both his assault battalions and routed Ovseenko’s riflemen, who were new recruits who had never seen action, and most had only been in uniform for less than a month. Choltitz then proceeded to pursue the fleeing Soviet troops for 2½ miles, tearing a huge hole in the Soviet outer defenses and marking him as a tactical commander of great ability.