Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Hansen temporarily halted his offensive on December 23 in order to regroup and resupply his forces, but in the interim Oktyabrsky’s warships escorted a five-ship convoy carrying Colonel Nikolai O. Guz’s 345th Rifle Division from Poti. Guz’s division had been preparing to take part in the Kerch amphibious operation and was a relatively strong unit, with 11,274 troops, 34 artillery pieces (including 13 122mm howitzers), 18 medium mortars, 25 radios, and 135 trucks. The division was relatively well trained by Red Army 1941 standards, even if most of the troops were comprised of Caucasian minorities such as Ossetians and Chechens, with only a third being Slavs. In addition, Oktyabrsky delivered the 81st Separate Tank Battalion (81 OTB), which had 30 T-26 light tanks. Petrov kept the tanks in reserve, but hustled Guz’s fresh infantry regiments into the center of his line to replace the shattered 388th Rifle Division. Vorob’ev also used the brief respite to build a new front line for Sector IV along the Bel’bek River.

Manstein realized that he had little time left to take Sevastopol before casualties, ammunition shortages, and the winter weather sapped the strength from his offensive. He ordered Hansen to make an all-out attack on December 25, anticipating that Petrov’s defenses were ready to crack. Hansen ordered the 22. and 132. Infanterie-Divisionen to mass 12 battalions against the boundary of Sectors III and IV, which now lay around Mekenzievy Mountain, and blast a way through to Severnaya Bay. However, this time the Soviet reinforcements had quick-marched into place before the Germans resumed their attacks, which now came to grief. The 132. Infanterie-Division’s five battalions were shocked to run into a regiment from Guz’s 345th Rifle Division, which repulsed IR 437’s attacks. Likewise, Potapov’s 79th Naval Infantry Brigade stood like a rock that IR 438 could not budge. Even Wolff’s heretofore unstoppable 22. Infanterie-Division could not penetrate Vorob’ev’s new line along the Bel’bek. Vilshansky even led a counterattack that succeeded in pushing back von Choltitz’s spent IR 16. Lieutenant Aleksandr in Coastal Battery No. 30 further sapped German frontline morale by engaging Wolff’s troops – now visible only a couple of miles away – with 30.5mm rounds fired in direct lay. The Germans were also now face-to-face with the still-intact fortifications of Petrov’s main defensive belt, including Fort Stalin. This ferocious display of Soviet firepower and tenacity was not to the taste of the German soldiers, who now began to realize that victory was no longer within their grasp. Even the supporting attack by the 170. Infanterie-Division and the Romanians in the Chernaya River valley miscarried, with heavy losses.

On Christmas morning, Manstein paused his offensive to give AOK 11 a brief respite, then ordered Hansen to resume the attacks with 22. and 132. Infanterie-Divisionen. The Germans focused all their efforts on capturing the area around the Mekenzievy Mountain station, which was believed to be the linchpin of Petrov’s defenses in Sector III. However, Petrov had received over 26,000 reinforcements and Manstein had received none, and now the threadbare German infantry battalions – some reduced to just 150–200 combat effectives – were up against the sturdy defenses of the Soviet main line of resistance. Only a few assault guns were still operational and the level of Luftwaffe and artillery support was dwindling, which made it impossible for the soldiers to storm concrete bunkers. Guz’s fresh 345th Rifle Division brought the 22. Infanterie-Division’s steady advance to a halt and then mounted a furious counterattack against Choltitz’s depleted IR 16. Soviet artillery fire was intense, including naval gunfire, and was provided by Petrov’s artillery and the armored train Zhelezniakov, which ducked out of its cave hideout to pepper the 132. Infanterie-Division with 100mm high-explosive shells. A major Soviet counterattack by Guz’s troops hit Choltitz’s regiment hard.

Late on Christmas night, Manstein received the first reports of enemy amphibious activity in the Kerch Straits and possible enemy landings, but he was not unduly concerned. He believed that the defeated 51st Army could only mount minor raids, which Sponeck’s XXXXII Armeekorps could handle. The offensive at Sevastopol would continue. However, it was clear that AOK 11 was too weak to break Petrov’s main line of resistance without substantial forces, and even though Manstein borrowed battalions from the 50. Infanterie-Division to reinforce Hansen’s divisions, this was not enough. Hansen’s forces were so exhausted that they were only capable of limited actions on December 26–27.