Where the Iron Crosses Grow

By early June, the entire western side of the Kamyschly Ravine was densely entrenched, and Zuckertort’s artillery preparation (Vorbereitungsfeuer) inflicted only moderate to light damage on the fieldworks and barbed-wire obstacles that lay at the base of the steep slope of the Stellenberg. Hansen’s assault plan for his LIV Armeekorps was to cross the Kamyschly Ravine with all three regiments of the 22. Infanterie-Division and two regiments each from the 50. and 24. Infanterie-Divisionen. A total of seven German infantry regiments with more than 10,000 troops would attack across the 2-mile-long Kamyschly Ravine; in contrast, the US Army landed just two infantry regiments on a 5-mile-wide front in the first wave at Omaha Beach in June 1944. This was the Schwerpunkt, where Manstein would mass all his resources on a narrow front to smash through the hard outer core of Petrov’s defenses.

Across from Hill 124, Generalmajor Ludwig Wolff’s 22. Infanterie-Division had assembled two battalions from Oberstleutnant Rudolf Buhse’s IR 47 and two battalions from Oberst Dietrich von Choltitz’s IR 16 on Hill 191.8 on the eastern side of the Kamyschly Ravine, overlooking the Soviet positions. This was a very dangerous space, as both sides regularly traded sniper and mortar fire across the 400-yard-wide ravine, so neither could move troops around much in the daylight. Nevertheless, the Germans managed to manhandle three batteries of 28/32cm Nebelwerfer 41 multiple rocket launchers from III./schweres Werfer-Regiment 1 up onto their hill during Zuckertort’s five-day artillery preparation – apparently without being noticed.²⁸ Petrov expected that an attack against Sectors III and IV was imminent, and on the night of June 6/7 he ordered all frontline units to conduct counterfire against suspected German assembly areas at 0255hrs on June 7. Potapov’s brigade had limited organic artillery – just four 122mm howitzers and 8 76.2mm field guns – so it relied heavily upon artillery support from Laskin’s neighboring division. Laskin’s division was supported by Colonel Josef F. Shmelkov’s 134th Howitzer Regiment, equipped with a rather obsolescent collection of ten 152mm M1909/30 howitzers and about 20 122mm M1910 howitzers. Shmelkov’s artillery fired against positions held by the 22. Infanterie-Division for 20 minutes, but achieved little since they had to conserve their ammunition.²⁹

At 0315hrs on June 7, Zuckertort’s artillery opened fire again, but this day was different. This day was “X-Day” – the beginning of the German ground assault. The Heeresartillerie fired with everything they had, attempting to lay waste to the Soviet frontline positions in a crushing artillery barrage.³⁰ The Stellenberg, currently occupied by the 5th Company from Potapov’s brigade, was hammered by sustained fire from 30.5cm howitzers for nearly an hour, but worse was to come.³¹ Without warning, the 18 Nebelwerfer 41 multiple rocket launchers began to hurl over 100 incendiary and high-explosive rockets onto the “Stellenberg,” setting underbrush afire and filling the Soviet trenches with dense, choking smoke. The blast affect was horrific even for troops in trenches, and the overpressure likely left many Soviet troops unconscious or shell-shocked. Even before the Nebelwerfers had finished launching their first volley, a red flare ascended into the morning sky, signaling the beginning of the ground assault. Stossgruppen from the 22. Infanterie-Division began to emerge from their assault positions and rush into the Kamyschly Ravine.