Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Simply moving up the steep, cratered sides of the “Stellenberg” in full combat gear was very difficult for Alvermann’s soldiers, and it was virtually a job for the Gebirgsjäger. Nevertheless, Alvermann led the I./IR 47 up the southeast corner of the hill while the III./IR 16 climbed the northeast corner. Atop the Stellenberg, the 5th Company was apparently stunned by the German artillery barrage and initially put up relatively little resistance until the Germans were at close quarters. Then a few troops rallied around Chief Petty Officer Bel’tikov, who manned a machine-gun position – his fire repulsed the first effort by III./IR 16 to rush to the top.³³ However, Alvermann led his battalion south of the Stellenberg, overran trenches held by Potapov’s 3rd Company, and managed to isolate the 5th Company and other troops from Potapov’s 2nd Battalion by 0550hrs. Potapov’s intent to reduce casualties from the artillery bombardment resulted in too few troops deployed on the forward key positions at the critical moment, and his limited reserves could not move quickly enough to reinforce threatened sectors in broad daylight under artillery and air bombardment. Schmidt’s 50. Infanterie-Division’s IR 123 had quickly overrun the village of Kamyschly, while IR 31 from the 24. Infanterie-Division was attempting to advance west toward the Trapeze. Potapov was faced with a typical dilemma of battlefield command – based upon limited information from his forward units, where should he send his limited reserves and direct his brigade fire support? Due to loss of contact with their forward observers, Potapov’s 120mm mortars and 76mm guns could only fire against pre-plotted engagement areas.

While all this was happening, two battalions of Oberst Ernst Haccius’s IR 65 began advancing west along the Bel’bek valley in front of the Stellenberg in an effort to attack the position from all sides, but they were held up by heavy enemy fire from the Ölberg and the “Bunkerberg,” both held by Major Shaslo’s 747th Rifle Regiment. Automatic weapons fire was also coming from an abandoned industrial building known as “the Tomato Factory” on the south side of the Bel’bek River. The Tomato Factory was another key position since it controlled the railroad cut that led up the ridge to the Ölberg, and blocked east–west movement along the Bel’bek River. The bombed-out facility itself was held by Lieutenant Vasil’kov’s machine gunners and 78 soldiers of the 5th Company of the 514th Rifle Regiment, while the 4th and 6th Companies were deployed in combat outposts north of the river. Captain Ivan A. Sharov also commanded a battery of entrenched 45mm antitank guns near the Tomato Factory. Haccius’s IR 65 had the unenviable task of clearing this obstacle with little or no cover, and while under enemy fire from several directions. Once again, the Nebelwerfers proved to be the deciding factor; III./ Werfer-Regiment 54 with 18 15cm Nebelwerfer 41s was brought onto the escarpment on the north side of the Bel’bek River, and Haccius’s forward observers directed fire against the Tomato Factory and the Bunkerberg.³⁴ Both targets were plastered with volley after volley of point-blank rocket fire. Haccius’s infantry then moved in, supported by assault guns from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190. This incident highlights one of the key differences between the attackers and the defenders in the third battle of Sevastopol; the Germans could generally call in timely artillery or air support to reduce strong enemy positions, but Soviet artillery was hindered by inadequate command and control, resulting in long response times and poorly directed fire missions.

Nevertheless, Sharov’s antitank gunners hit four of the German assault guns, but lost six of their guns in an unequal duel. Sharov was an ideal junior officer in the Red Army: coming from a peasant background, he was a veteran of the Russo-Finnish War and a Communist Party member. The fighting around the Tomato Factory soon involved close-quarter infantry combat, but Sharov and a few others managed to make it back to the Soviet lines.³⁵ It proved to be a bad day for Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, which had three more StuG IIIs knocked out by mines near Bel’bek, and the commander of 1. Kompanie was killed by a Soviet sniper.³⁶