Hitler was keenly following the attack from his headquarters near Rastenburg and received regular updates, particularly about the activities of Dora. On X-Day, Dora fired ten 80cm rounds, including seven at a Soviet ammunition depot on the north side of Severnaya Bay known as “White Cliff.” The White Cliff naval depot – so named because of the chalky cliffs – had a series of tunnel adits built into the side of the escarpment and had a number of separate munitions bunkers buried deep underground. It is often claimed that Dora scored a direct hit on White Cliff and detonated the entire storage of ammunition, but this is unlikely. Most rounds from Dora tended to be “over” the target, which meant that they landed harmlessly in Severnaya Bay. Furthermore, the depot was on a reverse slope and would have required a very high-angle plunging round or dive-bombing to hit; rounds from Dora would have been more likely to impact on the escarpment above the depot. Based upon the terrain, if the White Cliff depot was hit – and this is not confirmed by Soviet or German sources – then it was more likely from air attack than Dora. At any rate, at 1300hrs Manstein received a message relayed from Heeresgruppe Süd that, “the Führer was much upset because Dora fired at the ammunition dump ‘White Cliff’. The Führer stated that this gun is only intended to fire at concrete emplacements.” Oddly, the LIV Armeekorps claimed that it did not have any information about Dora firing against White Cliff and the journal indicated that someone had sent this report directly to the OKH in Berlin. Manstein told Hansen, “please determine who sent it.”42
Hitler was right to be upset that the heaviest weapon provided to AOK 11 was firing at an obscure target instead of supporting theIn the southern part of the Kamyschly Ravine, the German attack had not gone as well. Coming out of the Melzer ravine on the eastern side of the Kamyschly Ravine, Oberstleutnant Erich Reuter’s IR 122 from the 50. Infanterie-Division had both assault battalions badly shot up by an artillery concentration from Colonel Shmelkov’s 134th Howitzer Regiment. The 50. Infanterie-Division’s other regiment, Oberst Albert Ringler’s IR 121, had difficulty reaching the escarpment on the western side of the ravine, and the terrain was too rough for its attached assault guns to help much. Bärenfänger’s III./IR 123 had made a mile-deep advance onto the escarpment but was isolated for part of the day. It was not until the late afternoon that the 50. Infanterie-Division could mount a serious attack against the Trapeze position. After heavy casualties, IR 121 captured the Trapeze at 1615hrs. However, the 24. Infanterie-Division had failed to get across the Kamyschly Ravine at all during the morning due to heavy Soviet fire and was forced to follow in the tracks of the 50. Infanterie-Division.43
While the 50. Infanterie-Division succeeded in advancing a mile into the Soviet defensive positions on June 7 and protecting the 22. Infanterie-Division’s left flank, the 24. Infanterie-Division only succeeded in capturing one minor enemy position at the cost of over 600 casualties.Hansen was determined to capture the Ölberg on the first day of the ground offensive, but the assault battalions were tired and running short on ammunition, so the attack was put off until the late afternoon. In addition to the eight operational StuG IIIs still with Haccius’s IR 65, Hansen sent Panzer-Abteilung (FL) 300 to reinforce the assault troops. This unit had 14 Pz IIIJ tanks, six KV-1 tanks captured during