Augustus

Octavian and Agrippa agreed not to let Antony’s fleet through the blockade without opposition; it might be difficult to catch up with the fleet, and its escape scot-free would give Antony the initiative and have a damaging impact on opinion among the armed forces and in Italy. But if they waited in the open seas, sooner or later Antony would be forced to come out and meet them on waters of their choosing. When that happened, they would try to outflank him in the north (the obstacle of Leucas prevented that maneuver in the south). They would then either surround his smaller fleet, or force him to elongate and thin his line of ships, which would make it easier for their galleys to surround individual enemy ships and pick them off.

The balance of forces at sea decidedly favored Octavian. Although Antony’s fleet had numbered about five hundred when it mustered at Ephesus, it is unlikely that he now had enough rowing crews for more than 230 ships, and he may have been able to man far fewer; whereas Octavian disposed of more than four hundred ships. Antony’s galleys were larger than Octavian’s and had more oarsmen, but they were probably no less maneuverable; this, of course, was in his favor.

Antony was forced to delay whatever move he planned, for on August 29 the fine weather broke. Four days of storm followed, and inactivity. On September 2, the weather cleared and the morning came up blue and sunny. The fleets took to the water.

Agrippa, to whom Octavian had wisely delegated tactical command, loaded eight legions and five praetorian cohorts onto his ships (that is, about forty thousand men, approximately ninety per galley), which he deployed about one mile off the headlands Parginosuala and Scylla, which marked the entry into the Actium narrows. There Agrippa waited to see what the enemy would do.

Antony divided his fleet, which was carrying twenty thousand legionaries and some archers, into four squadrons. One of these was Cleopatra’s, with sixty ships in total, including some merchantmen. The queen herself was on her flagship, the Antonias, together with vast quantities of gold and silver coin, ingots, and other valuables. The personal safety of the queen was important, of course, but it was absolutely essential that the war chest did not find its way to Octavian or to the bottom of the sea.

The remainder of the army, totaling about fifty thousand men, was under the command of Publius Canidius Crassus, a long-standing partisan of Antony who had campaigned with great success in Armenia. If the fleet managed to make a getaway, he was to march to Macedonia, if possible, and then the east.

Before setting off, Antony gave his ships’ captains the unusual order to take their sails with them, claiming this would help to ensure that not a single enemy ship escaped capture. Sails were seldom if ever used in battle (they took up too much room when stowed and reduced maneuverability when set); his men, seeing through Antony’s flimsy rationale, realized with dismay that he was not confident of victory, indeed that he anticipated flight.

Dellius had briefed Agrippa about Antony’s arrangements, including the decision to load the sails. Also, the men from the two armies who were not with the fleets lined the shores to watch events at sea. Octavian’s soldiers were able to see exactly what Antony was doing in the strait and may very well have kept their commanders informed, by small boat or some form of signaling.

As anticipated, the ships emerged from the strait, rowing in file, and deployed in two lines that stretched between the headlands. There they halted. Cleopatra’s squadron hung behind the lines, and did not look as if it was going to play an active part in the battle.

Antony waited hopefully for the enemy to accept the bait, sail toward the opening of the strait, and give battle. The ploy failed, for Agrippa sensibly refused to move. A very long pause followed that lasted all morning. The two fleets, perhaps a mile apart, rested on their oars.

Agrippa waited for Antony to accept that his bluff had been called, move his ships forward, and leave the comparative safety of the strait for the open sea. This he eventually did, stationing himself with the squadron on the right. The command of his left wing was given to the competent Sosius.

At this point our sources are blinded by the fog of battle and we have only the broadest and vaguest view of what happened. Plutarch gives a good general impression: