Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire

The Russian government would, however, shun the label of an empire or a reimperializing power. In the case of Crimea’s annexation, Moscow argued that it was righting a historic wrong by taking back Russian land that was unfairly given to Ukraine by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in 1954. In the case of Georgia or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, Moscow (with its supporters) has argued that Russia was simply trying to protect its sphere of influence and interests that were under threat from NATO and EU expansion. For instance, following the Russo-Georgian war in August of 2008 then-President Dmitry Medvedev stated that “As is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.”³⁵ In 2014, Secretary of the Security Council of Russia Nikolai Patrushev was quick to emphasize Russia’s “assets,” all the while arguing that the United States seeks expansion at the expense of Russian interests. According to Patrushev, in the 1990s “Russia unilaterally surrendered its assets on the world stage without being compensated at all.”³⁶ Yet, underneath all of these arguments regarding spheres of influence and inherently Russian lands and “assets” is the same tone of an imperial power seeking to maintain its empire or reimperialize. Indeed, as Motyl states: “Important as historical reality, conceptual category, and analytical device, empires refuse to go away.”³⁷ In the case of Russia, compatriots become a pretext and sometimes an ideological driver in this broader quest for empire that provides a mission, (at times) greater economic and population resources, and most often, a sense of greater security and a distraction from domestic problems.

In the analysis of the driving forces of a state’s foreign policy, it is helpful to assess their nature. Are these forces primarily structural? Are they fostered by agents of history? Are they driven by personalities? To apply these competing views to Russia’s situation, one might ask: Is Russia’s reimperialization driven by structural factors like the global balance of power and the balance of power and resources between Russia and its near abroad states? Or has the figure of Vladimir Putin been central in policies of reimperialization? Certainly, Putin has been an important architect in the political reconstruction of the Russian diaspora into Russian compatriots and in launching the policy of their military protection during the 2000s on the principle of protecting the “legitimate rights and interests” of Russian citizens abroad.³⁸ On the other hand, the Russian diaspora and Russia’s quest for empire predate Putin by centuries and will likely remain issues long after Putin retires from power. Putin’s policies reflect in many ways the ambitions of the Russian society and state, as demonstrated by his 85 percent approval rating in late 2014.³⁹ For the purposes of this analysis, I will not aim to unpack the Kremlin’s decision-making apparatus, but will take note of the different actors in Russian foreign policy such as the executive leadership, the Foreign Ministry, and the Russian military, and will pay particular attention to individuals like Putin and even to the legacies of Joseph Stalin. In the end, I hold that Russia’s structural and historical predilections have played the key role in its quest for reimperialization, while Putin’s leadership and the related domestic political circumstances have been strongly contributing rather than central factors. Throughout this book the focus will fall on the potential structural, ideological-historical, economic, and political drivers of Russia’s reimperialization regarding each set of states discussed.

DRIVERS OF IMPERIAL REVIVAL