Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire

Simply put, this book will argue that reimperialization—either by regaining lost territories or by maintaining influence and sometimes regaining it where it has been lost—is the end-goal of Moscow’s policies. The politically constructed Russian compatriots are one of the means. In some regards this claim of reimperialization is less controversial than it sounds, since one of the seminal theories of international relations, realism, assumes that a state’s primary interest lies in maximizing its power and resources. Nonetheless, a number of questions remain about why, weighing its abilities and constraints as well as the costs and benefits, Russia would seek reimperialization. What are the drivers that lead the Russian elite and the government of Vladimir Putin to rebuild the Russian empire? The ideological-historical, structural, political, and economic drivers of Russian motives and interests are sometimes the same and sometimes vary in regard to the different post-Soviet states. Putin’s regime has emphasized the ideological themes of uniting the divided Russian nation and of Russia’s mission in the world stemming from its unique cultural identity as the home of Slavic and Orthodox Christian civilization. Russia’s self-perception is one of empire, and this ideology has been created over the centuries of Russia’s history as a multiethnic imperial state where the Russian nation held a privileged position. As the Russian empire is strongly wedded to the Russian national psyche so Russian imperialism is wedded to Russian nationalism.⁴⁰ Opinion polls show that from 1996 to 2012 among the primary expectations of the Russian public from their president has been to restore or maintain “Russia’s superpower status.”⁴¹ The Russian civilization, nation, and in turn the compatriots figure prominently in Moscow’s ideological, historical, and cultural rationales for reimperialization. In this unique blend of nationalist and imperialist ideology, the compatriots are parts of the “body” of Russia and of Russian civilization.

The Russian empire has also historically served as means to Moscow’s security. The Muscovites were under siege from both Europe and Asia: from the Mongol hordes in the thirteenth century to Napoleonic armies in 1812. The states of the Caucasus and Central Asia and their territories served as a buffer zone for Russia in the south against Islamic civilizations of the Middle East. Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova continue to serve as buffer zones against Europe and now NATO, while the Baltic States (now NATO members) are sorely missed from Moscow’s zone of influence. At the same time Russia and all former Soviet republics (excluding the Baltic States) are now members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. Nonetheless, recurring talks for NATO membership for, say, Georgia or Ukraine have caused a violent reaction (both metaphorically and literally speaking) in Moscow. Despite Tbilisi’s or Kiev’s right to choose its foreign policy, Moscow still perceives these states as part of its neo-imperial project.

When assessing Russia’s foreign policy priorities vis-à-vis the former Soviet republics, one could question if rather than reimperialization, Moscow’s agenda is solely one of limiting the foreign policy options of the former Soviet republics—preventing their integration into the EU and NATO and instead ensuring their deep integration into Moscow-led economic and political institutions. This would guarantee “good-neighborly relations” between Russia and the post-Soviet world.⁴² Yet, this perspective stems from the notion that Russia is entitled to special interests within a sphere of influence or in the words of Doyle, that “one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society.”⁴³ One could also conclude that Moscow is seeking to create a new and alternative order in the post-Soviet space. At a minimum, this would entail the Eurasian Economic Union—a Moscow-led political and economic union between Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan established in 2015, replacing the Eurasian Customs Union of 2010 and the prior Eurasian Economic Community of 2000. At a maximum, Moscow’s plans for the post-Soviet space would entail a new political entity that would include within its borders Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.⁴⁴

Within the security rationale for reimperialization, the Russian compatriots also play an important role. By taking over territories inhabited by compatriots, Moscow is able to establish stronger defenses and borders than if it were to take over potentially less loyal territories. Furthermore, national security and power are in no small part a function of size. Russia’s population is less than half that of the United States, about one-third that of the European Union, and only one-eighth that of China. Russia’s compatriot policy coupled with reimperialization enlarges Russia’s population and territories.