Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire

These costs notwithstanding, there has been no sign that either economic pressure or international isolation has deterred Russia’s expansionist strategy post-Crimea. This suggests that historical-ideological, domestic political, and security issues, rather than economic drivers, have been paramount in Putin’s efforts to challenge the borders of the former Soviet republics. As the seemingly more liberal President Medvedev stated in August 2008 after the Georgian war, “We are not afraid of anything, including the prospect of a new Cold War.”⁵² Likewise, both policy developments of 2014 and 2015 suggest (and Kremlin insiders confirm) that Putin is less interested in the economy than in great power politics, and most of all interested in remaining in power.⁵³ Since Crimea, Moscow has been increasingly bolder in sending its troops and weapons to eastern Ukraine despite NATO’s pressure, the tragedy of the downing of Flight MH17 by Russian-supported militias, the Minsk I cease-fire agreement, the rocket attack on civilian targets in Ukraine’s southern city of Mariupol, and even the Minsk II agreement of February 2015. Moreover, the intensity and gravity of incidents involving Russian and Western militaries and security agencies visibly increased. In 2014 there were over forty incidents from the Baltic Sea to the High North and Canada, which involved violations of national airspace, emergency scrambles, narrowly avoided midair collisions, close encounters at sea, simulated attack runs, and other dangerous actions occurring on a regular basis.⁵⁴ In October 2014, NATO reported that it had intercepted more than one hundred Russian aircraft, three times more than in 2013—many of them intruders into the airspace of the Baltic States.⁵⁵ Indeed, there are no signs to suggest that high economic and diplomatic costs will lead Putin to abandon his imperial revival project in the years to come.

OVERVIEW

The next chapter sets out my proposed seven phases of the reimperialization policy trajectory. The discussion will highlight the tight connection between Russia’s softer means of influence and its hard power tactics that may result in territorial annexation. The proposed trajectory should be viewed as an explanatory tool rather than a timetable for further Russian adventurism or expansionism.

Chapter 3 examines Moscow’s policies and legal framework regarding its diaspora from the 1990s to 2015, demonstrating how over time ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, and other minorities abroad have been politically conceptualized as “compatriots.” The chapter highlights the development of Moscow’s policies in the 2000s from perceiving compatriots as a problem to seeing them as a potential resource to be employed for Russia’s geopolitical aspirations. The origins of the term “compatriot” are reviewed, as well as Stalin’s ethnic policies that created the present-day conditions of the Russian diaspora and ethnically mixed states.

In Chapter 4, case studies are presented where Moscow’s policies have completed the full progression of the reimperialization policy trajectory from soft power to compatriot protection to separatism and finally to annexation. Analysis of Ukraine places the 2014–15 war in a broader framework of Russia’s policies, demonstrating how the annexation of Crimea as well as the ongoing separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine were gradually achieved with soft power, passportization, and information warfare policies. The case of Ukraine is contrasted to Moscow’s policies toward Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and Moldova’s Transnistria and Gagauzia.

The unique case of the Baltic States as EU and NATO members is discussed in Chapter 5. The implications of Russia’s compatriot policies in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are assessed, particularly how these policies are evolving beyond soft power tools toward passportization and information warfare. The chapter evaluates the successes and failures of Russia’s policies and the likelihood of future conflict by drawing on past examples such as Moscow-incited tensions in Tallinn in the 2000s, and comparison with the conflicts in eastern Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and beyond.

Chapter 6 considers the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in regard to Russian compatriot policies, showing that Kazakhstan bears the most risk for the long-term expansionist implications of these policies because of the large numbers of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers residing in territories on Russia’s border. The chapter traces the variations in Russia’s pursuit of reimperialization in the Central Asian states, demonstrating that in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan Russia had difficulty moving beyond soft power and humanitarian and compatriot support in the face of the authoritarian nature of these regimes and their nation-building policies.