Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire

There are also domestic electoral factors stoking Putin’s expansionist drive. Russia’s military exploits—taming Chechnya’s rebellion, victory in the Russo-Georgian war, taking back Crimea, “protecting” Russians in southeastern Ukraine—have all boded well for Putin’s personal popularity. Putin first made a name for himself as Russia’s new president elect when he sent troops to Chechnya in January of 2000, gaining an 84 percent approval rating.⁴⁵ In 2014 pending Crimea’s annexation, Putin’s approval rating was 72 percent, marking a three-year high after several years of decline, which continued to increase to 85 percent by the end of 2014, almost as high as in 2008 following the Georgian war when his approval rating was 88 percent.⁴⁶ Compatriots also feed into in the domestic motives for reimperialization because their incorporation into the Russian Federation appeals to the strong ethnic and cultural dimensions of Russian national rather than civic identity. Finally, another domestic factor in Russia’s drive for reimperialization, or perhaps more precisely an effort to hold on to its sphere of influence, is driven by the fear of and desire to contain the success of popular movements calling for regime change that have swept the post-Soviet space. The “colored” popular revolutions started with Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004, Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution of 2005, Moldova’s Grape or Twitter Revolution in 2009, and Ukraine’s Maidan of 2013–14. The overturning of stagnant and corrupt regimes could only serve as an example to the Russian people, and Moscow’s massive public protests in 2011–13 only reinforced this potential threat to the Putin regime.

There are also economic motives behind Russia’s imperial hold on the post-Soviet space. Russia has worked hard to maintain the post-Soviet states in its economic fold by its Eurasian Customs Union and Eurasian Economic Union projects. However, the alternative of EU membership also held appeal for a number of CIS states, including Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, which defied Moscow and started negotiating association agreements and working to meet the conditionality requirements. It is no coincidence that flashpoints between Russia on the one hand and Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Ukraine on the other occurred when these countries were seeking closer ties to the EU. The resulting conflicts and challenges to Moldova’s, Georgia’s, and Ukraine’s territorial integrity will serve as a significant hindrance to these states’ aspirations to join the EU in the future.

When assessing Moscow’s economic interests and motives for reimperialization, it is imperative to understand that the Russian economy is driven by natural resources. Countries that either possess such resources or provide land and sea routes to export them to other markets are and historically have been potential targets of Russia’s expansion. Through the territories of Ukraine and Belarus, pipelines export Russian energy sources to European markets. The pipeline crossing Ukraine transports up to half of Russian gas exports to Europe, while the ports of Crimea offer quick access to the eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, and the Middle East. The ports of the Baltic States have historically served to transport Russia’s oil and oil products to European markets until the mid-2000s. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan themselves possess vast resources of coal, oil, and gas. Through Georgian territory runs the competing Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the second longest of the former Soviet Union, which brings Caspian (instead of Russian) oil to Turkey and the Mediterranean.⁴⁷ Russia’s own vast energy resources have served as powerful means of influence in the near abroad. Members of the Russian diaspora have played their part in this great game of energy influence. Looking across the CIS states, the Baltic States, and beyond, politicians and businessmen loyal to Moscow (often but not always ethnically Russian and with connections to the Kremlin) have benefited from lucrative energy contracts and advantageous deals.⁴⁸ Corrupt deal-making has allowed Moscow to put in its pocket a number of politicians not only from its near abroad but increasingly from the EU.⁴⁹