Russia at war 1941-1945

advanced rapidly in the north, and only slowly in the centre, the line of the front had nearly doubled in length by the middle of January. On January 15, Hitler, though

resigned to abandoning some territory, gave a further order to his troops to take up strong defensive positions east of Rzhev, Viazma, Gzhatsk and Yukhnovo. Rigorous

disciplinary measures were introduced, and Haider, the Chief of Staff, issued a directive denouncing panic and bewilderment and prophesying that the Russian offensive would

soon peter out.

The Russian History now admits that the strengthening of German resistance by propaganda, disciplinary measures, and reinforcements from the west, was underrated by the Soviet High Command. Already on January 25, the Russians suffered their first major setback in failing to take Gzhatsk by storm; in the south—west of Tula—the German

resistance was stiffening as well, and on this sector of the front the Red Army came virtually to a standstill by the end of January.

But the Supreme Command still persisted with its plan for a big encirclement, and

decided to drop a large number of paratroops in the enemy rear, to cut enemy

communications and to serve as a link between the pincers which were expected to close round the Germans near Smolensk. Yet German resistance was increasing everywhere

and all Russian attempts to break through to Viazma, the nodal point in the German

defences, were doomed to failure.

In a number of places the Germans started counter-attacking. Renewed massive tank

attacks, especially in the Viazma area, produced more heroic deeds on the part of the Russians, similar to that of the Panfilov men at Volokolamsk in December. Inside a

cartridge case embedded in a tree trunk a note was found after the war written by a dying soldier, Alexander Vinogradov, who, with twelve others, had been sent to stop German tanks from advancing along the Minsk highway—

... And now there are only three of us left... We shall stand firm as long as there's any life left in us... Now I am alone, wounded in my arm and my head. The number

of tanks has increased. There are twenty-three. I shall probably die. Somebody may find my note and remember ne; I am a Russian, from Frunze. I have no parents.

Goodbye, dear friends. Your Alexander Vinogradov. 22.2.42.

It is quite clear that the Russian High Command overrated both the Russian armies'

driving force and the breakdown in the morale and organisation of the Wehrmacht after the setbacks they had suffered in December and the first part of January.

The plans to encircle and smash all the German forces between Moscow and Smolensk,

as well as to recapture Orel and Briansk proved much too ambitious. With the Germans mostly dug in, and the Russians advancing, the conditions created by a particularly harsh winter ultimately affected the Russians more than it did the Germans. Not only were

reserves in both men and equipment insufficient (industrial production of war material was, as explained before, at its lowest ebb), but what reserves were used were thrown in piecemeal. Thus, the Stavka's order that Briansk be recaptured, and reinforcements be sent to that area, diverted the Red Army from its main aim, which was to smash the

Germans in the Viazma area. The orders issued by the Stavka as late as March 20 that the Red Army should occupy a line close to Smolensk (Belyi-Dorogobuzh-Yelnya-Krasnoye,

twenty-eight miles south-west of Smolensk), that it should join up with the Russians'

units in the enemy rear, and that it should capture Gzhatsk by April 1 and Viazma about the same time, as well as Briansk, and capture Rzhev not later than April 5, turned out to be totally unrealistic.

The thaw that set in at the end of March reduced still further the Red Army's mobility; nor did the Red Army, by this time, have much air support, and its supply lines had

practically broken down. By the end of March the Russian offensive came to a complete standstill. For many months after the offensive had stopped parachutists and other troops in the enemy rear under Cavalry General Belov, and the local partisans, continued to harass German communications, but the net result of the January-March 1942 operations was bitterly disappointing after the enthusiasm caused by the Battle of Moscow proper.

[According to the Russians the bulk of the men in the Suchevka pocket did not break out until the following June.]