Russia at war 1941-1945

Russian losses were much higher than those of the Germans; the troops were worn out, and the shortage of equipment and ammunition began to be keenly felt by the middle of February. True, large areas had been liberated—the whole of the Moscow province, most of the Kalinin province, the whole of the Tula, and most of the Kaluga province. But the large Rzhev-Gzhatsk-Viazma springboard, which was to continue to threaten Moscow,

had remained in German hands. Some deadly fighting was to go on for this in the

summer of 1942, and it was not till the beginning of 1943 that the Germans were driven out of it. Many soldiers who had fought at various parts of the front later told me that perhaps the most heart-breaking months in their experience were February-March 1942.

After the high hopes that had been raised by the Battle of Moscow, everything seemed to be going wrong again. The Germans had lost the Battle of Moscow, but they were clearly very far from finished.

Commenting on the results of the Russian winter offensive, the present-day Russian

History makes the following important points:

The moral effect even of the incomplete victory of the Red Army during the winter campaign of 1941-2 was enormous, and decisively strengthened the Soviet people's

faith in ultimate victory;

The effect on highly dubious neutrals like Turkey and Japan was little short of

overwhelming;

Thanks to the Russian winter offensive, it was now possible to stop the evacuation of central-Russian industry to the east, which meant that the output of armaments and munitions in the Moscow area in particular could be resumed and intensified; in

some cases, plants were brought back from the east.

Nevertheless, the winter offensive did not achieve all the desired results:

The offensive took place in exceptionally difficult conditions. The Red Army still lacked the experience of organising and conducting a large-scale offensive

operation. The extreme cold, the deep snow, the very limited number of usable

roads, severely limited manoeuvrability. The delivery of supplies and the

organisation of airfields met with enormous difficulties. Nor could the country supply

the Army with all it needed by way of equipment, armaments and munitions. All this

had a bad effect on the tempo of the offensive, and on the performance of the troops,

and often prevented the Red Army from making the best use of favourable conditions

for the annihilation of large enemy groupings. This first attempt to mount a strategic counter-offensive and then a general offensive along the whole front was marked by some serious mistakes on the part of the Supreme Command, and of the command

of separate army groups.

[IVOVSS, vol. II, p. 359. (Emphasis added.)]

What were these mistakes and shortcomings?

1) The Supreme Command did not always make the best use of the reserves at its

disposal. Often troops were thrown into battle without sufficient preliminary training.

The recognition of this error was reflected in the new regulations issued by the State Defence Committee on March 16, 1942.

2) On the whole, the Red Army also lacked large mechanised and armoured units, which greatly reduced the troops' striking force and the speed of their advance; the Germans, on the contrary, used concentrated tank formations in their counter-attacks, even in the winter conditions of 1941-2.

What is more, having over-estimated the results of the December-January counter-