Russia at war 1941-1945

... except that parts of it were printed in Pravda... and that we were asked to receive a Russian military mission. The silence at the top was oppressive, and I thought it my duty to break the ice. I quite understood that they might feel shy, considering all that had passed since the outbreak of the war.. .

[Volume III, p. 340.]

Maybe they were shy; but, in reality, they were delighted and, as I often heard it said at the time, "pleasantly surprised " by Churchill's broadcast; with their peculiar mentality, they had thought an Anglo-German deal not entirely out of the question, and they had been confirmed in this suspicion ever since the Hess episode.

Although Stalin did not communicate with Churchill personally until after the latter had written to him on July 7, he hastened to establish close relations with Cripps. Barely a week after the invasion, the first batch of the British Military Mission, with General Mason MacFarlane at its head, flew to Moscow. At the same time Cripps had been

discussing with both Stalin and Molotov the terms of a joint Anglo-Soviet Declaration, which was to be made public on July 12. The idea of this joint declaration originated on the Russian side, as is apparent from Churchill's message to Cripps of July 10.

It is reasonable to suppose that if Stalin did not communicate with Churchill immediately after the latter's broadcast of June 22, it was because the Soviet Government was

bewildered by what was happening. After all, it took Stalin fully eleven days after the invasion to formulate anything in the nature of a policy statement even to his own people.

Also without necessarily feeling "shy", Stalin may well have had a variety of long-standing inhibitions, doubts and reservations about British policy, and may have been anxious to secure the Anglo-Soviet Declaration before proceeding any further. And

when, finally, on July 18, he did write to Churchill, it was to propose the establishment of a Second Front—"in the west (northern France) and in the north (the Arctic)".

The best time to open this Front is now, seeing that Hitler's forces have been

switched to the east... It would be easier still to open a Front in the north. This would call for action only by British naval and air forces, without landing troops or artillery. Soviet land, naval and air forces could take part in the operation. We would be glad if Great Britain could send thither, say, one light division or more ofthe Norwegian volunteers, who could be moved to Northern Norway for insurgent

operations against the Germans.

Churchill, in his reply of July 21, dismissed all this as totally unrealistic, including the Norwegian light division, which was simply "not in existence", but proposed a number of naval operations in the Arctic, and the establishment of a number of British fighter squadrons at Murmansk.

On July 26, Churchill wrote to Stalin again, saying that 200 Tomahawks would soon be sent to Russia; that two or three million pairs of ankle boots "should shortly be available in this country for shipment", and that, moreover, "large quantities of rubber, tin, wool and woollen clothes, jute, lead and shellac" would be provided.

All this was only a small beginning; but it should be remembered that in the summer of 1941 Britain was, in fact, Russia's only ally; the United States was not in the war yet.

This would partly explain a certain petulance in Stalin's tone in his relations with Britain, and particularly with Churchill: this was the only country from which he could "demand"

direct military co-operation; but since such direct military aid was clearly not

forthcoming, the most important thing to do was to try to obtain from the West the

maximum economic aid in the form of armaments and raw materials; and, in this respect, the United States was far more important than Britain.

The big question—and Stalin was fully aware of it—which bothered both Britain and the United States was whether Russian resistance to Germany could, or could not, last any length of time. As one could guess at the time, and as we know now, Churchill was by no means certain that Russia would "last" long.