Russia at war 1941-1945

motorised divisions, none of diem were a match for the German Panzer divisions.

All the same, he believed that the large Russian tanks were better than any German tanks...

The Red Army, he said, had now 4,000 large tanks, 8,000 medium tanks and 12,000

light tanks; the Germans had a total of 30,000 tanks.

His tank production now was only 1,000 per month, he said, and Russia would be short of steel.

He urged that orders for this steel be placed at once. Later he said it would be much better if his tanks could be manufactured in the United States. He also wished to purchase as many tanks as possible to be ready for the spring campaign. He said the all-important thing was the production of tanks during the winter—the tank losseswere very great on both sides, but Germany could produce more tanks per month

this winter than Russia. He would like to send a tank expert to the United States and would give the United States his tank designs.

[ Sherwood, op cit., pp. 337-8.]

"He gave", Hopkins goes on, "a much more glowing account of Russia's aircraft position, and said that the German claims of Russian air losses were 'absurd'." Nevertheless, "he expressed considerable interest in training pilots in America, and left me the impression that there would soon be a shortage of pilots."

Stalin repeatedly stated that he did not underrate the German Army. Their

organisation was of the very best, and they had large reserves of food, men, supplies and fuel... The German Army is [therefore] capable of taking part in a winter

campaign in Russia. He thought, however, that it would be difficult for the Germans to operate offensively much after September 1, when the heavy rains would begin.

After October 1 the ground would be so bad that they would have to go on the

defensive. He expressed great confidence that the line during the winter months

would be in front of Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad, probably not more than 100 km.

away from where it was now. He... thought the Germans were "tired", and had no stomach for an offensive. .. Though Germany could bring up forty divisions, making 275 divisions in all, these divisions probably could not get there before the hard weather set in.

[Ibid., p. 340.]

At this second meeting, Stalin again insisted that the Red Army's first need was antiaircraft guns—"vast quantities of these to give protection to its lines of communications; secondly, aluminium for the construction of aeroplanes; thirdly, machine-guns and

rifles."

As regards the ports of entry, he thought Archangel "difficult, but not impossible" since icebreakers could keep the port free all winter; Vladivostok he thought dangerous, as Japan could cut it off at any time, and the roads and railroads of Persia "inadequate".

"He [Stalin] expressed repeatedly his confidence that the Russian lines would hold within 200 km. of their present position ... and indicated that the front would be solidified not later than October 1."

It is clear from what Hopkins told Stalin that he was not entirely convinced that the Russians would survive the autumn: