Russia at war 1941-1945

The British military were almost unanimous in believing that Russia would be defeated in a short time: even at press conferences given during the first days of the war at the Ministry of Information in London, War Office spokesmen made no secret of it. Their

tone became slightly different by the middle of July, largely, one suspects, as a result of the dispatches sent from Moscow by General Mason MacFarlane who, while referring

occasionally to "this bloodstained régime", nevertheless did not underrate the fighting qualities of the Red Army. Mason MacFarlane, with whom I had numerous talks in

Moscow, appeared convinced, even during the blackest moments, that the Russians were at any rate determined to fight a very long war, and that even the loss of Moscow—which was not to be ruled out early in October—would not mean the end.

Opinion at the American Embassy in Moscow was rather divided. The Military Attaché,

Major Ivan Yeaton, was convinced that the Red Army would be smashed in a very short

time; Ambassador Steinhardt took less gloomy a view; but the big clash between the two schools of thought was not to come until later, with the appointment as Lend-Lease

representative in Moscow of Colonel Philip R. Faymonville. This appointment was made by President Roosevelt at Harry Hopkins's suggestion. Faymonville had accompanied

Harriman to Moscow at the end of September, and he was convinced from the start that the Red Army's prospects were by no means as hopeless as Yeaton had been making out

ever since the beginning of the invasion.

The fact that Faymonville should have been appointed to Moscow at Hopkins's

suggestion was highly significant. It was Hopkins who unquestionably decided, during his visit to Moscow at the end of July that the Russians could, if not win the war, at any rate hold out for a very long time, and this was also the view held by Faymonville. And after the Battle of Moscow, Faymonville became finally convinced that the Russians

would not lose the war.

Harry Hopkins's visit was of crucial importance to the whole future of American-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet relations. As Robert E. Sherwood wrote:

The flight [from Archangel] to Moscow took four hours, and during it Hopkins

began to be reassured as to the future of the Soviet Union. He looked down upon the hundreds of miles of solid forest, and he thought that Hitler with all the Panzer divisions of the Wehrmacht could never hope to break through country like this.

On arriving in Moscow

Hopkins had a long talk with Steinhardt in which he said that the main purpose of his visit was to determine whether the situation was as disastrous as pictured in the War Department, and particularly as indicated in the cables from the Military

Attaché, Major Ivan Yeaton.

The views of Ambassador Steinhardt, as described by Sherwood, tally with Steinhardt's attitude, as I was able to observe it in Moscow in the summer of 1941.

Steinhardt said [to Hopkins] that anyone who knew anything about Russian history

would hardly jump to the conclusion that the Germans would achieve easy

conquest. Russian soldiers might appear inept when engaged in offensive operations

—they had done so in the Napoleonic wars and again in Finland. But when they

were called upon to defend their homeland they were superb fighters, and there

were certainly a great many of them. But, Steinhardt emphasised, it was supremely difficult for any outsider to get a clear picture of what was really going on... because of the prevailing attitude of suspicion toward all foreigners and consequent

secretiveness. Hopkins said that he was determined somehow or other to break

through this wall of suspicion.