Russia at war 1941-1945

launched a major offensive in the Kursk-Voronezh sector... They broke through our defences south of Kursk and on July 8 came very close to Voronezh. However, the

stubborn resistance and the counter-attacks of the Soviet troops of the newly-

formed Voronezh Front stopped the German advance, and the Nazi high command

therefore turned part of these troops towards the south, along the right bank of the Don-on the way to Stalingrad.... The Soviet troops, retreating under the pressure of superior enemy forces, nevertheless resisted heroically, and thus gained valuable time, which was used for throwing in reserves and strengthening the defensive

capacity of Stalingrad... But with 1,200 planes in this area of the front, the enemy had great superiority in aircraft, as well as in guns and tanks.

[ Telpukhovsky, op. cit., pp. 119-20.]

Within a short time the parts of the Donbas still in Russian hands were overrun, the important industrial city of Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk) falling on July 19. More rapid still was the German advance further north into the Don country; and only at Voronezh,

further north still, were the Germans stopped. Here the Russians succeeded in averting the danger of a German breakthrough to the Tambov-Saratov area—which would have

meant that Moscow's main communications with the east would be cut before long. It is still not clear, despite much discussion by historians of both sides, whether such an advance on Tambov-Saratov ever entered the German plans; but the possibility was

clearly envisaged on the Russian side, and very strong Russian forces were concentrated for that reason in the Voronezh area.

Communications with the east and south-east had already become highly precarious; the Caspian-Volga waterway, with its ships and tanker-fleet was one of the principal Russian supply-lines, the equivalent of ten railways. Practically all the Caucasus oil came along the Volga route. After the ice had melted in the spring of 1942 enormous quantities of Caucasian oil had been shipped to Moscow and central Russia—the equivalent of about a year's reserve; but with the beginning of the summer campaign German bombing of the

Volga line made it more and more hazardous. Russia's alternative oil supplies from the east depended on the railways running through the Saratov-Tambov area, which was one reason for the Russian determination to stop the Germans at Voronezh at any price. The grave danger of a critical oil shortage was emphasised in Moscow in July 1942, when the most drastic cuts were made in petrol rations, even for some of the most privileged

categories of users.

Except for the very important German failure to break through at Voronezh, the general outlook was very serious indeed.

[In Moscow at the time some military observers, e.g. General Petit, the French military attaché, who had close contacts with Russian top brass, attached the utmost importance to this; had the Germans broken through at Voronezh, Moscow might have been encircled;

by spreading south, the Germans were much less dangerous, and were less likely to

achieve any quick and decisive results.]

The breakthrough into the wide open spaces of the Don country was bad enough; but the real shock to the Russian people came with the announcement on July 28 that

Novocherkassk and Rostov had been lost. This meant that the Germans were now going

to invade the Kuban and the Caucasus. At the same time, they were already far inside the Don country, and were busy forcing the Don on the southern side of the bend at

Tsymlianskaya, on the way to Stalingrad.

What happened at Rostov? Many dark hints were dropped at the time both in the press

and in private conversations. The gist of it all was that certain Red Army units had panicked and fled, and that officers and generals had lost their heads under the fierceness of the German onslaught. This time the Germans had attacked Rostov from the north and north-east, and not from the west, as in 1941; east and north-east Rostov had no defences to speak of. It was made clear in the press that no orders had been given to abandon the city, and that here was a clear case of disobedience. Many were shot and demoted: