Russia at war 1941-1945

generals, officers and ordinary soldiers. There is no doubt that a cry of "Pull yourselves together!" went through the country; and this cry was loudly echoed in the press. It talked more and more in the days that followed of the "iron discipline" that had been introduced, and the fall of Rostov was openly attributed to "cowards and panic-stricken creatures"

who had failed in their duty to defend the city. There are some rather puzzling aspects about the whole "Rostov affair". Militarily, it is extremely doubtful whether, in the circumstances of July 1942, it could have been held for any length of time, and it has even been suggested (perhaps with some hindsight) that any attempt to make of Rostov another "Sebastopol" could only have ended in encirclement which, in turn, would have entailed the useless loss of many thousands of valuable troops. It seems clear that, on the pretext that Rostov had been abandoned without orders, the government was going to use the tremendous shock caused in the country by the fall of the city for a vast

psychological, as well as organisational operation.

[See pp. 414 ff.]

Anyone who was in Russia at the time knows that the great anxiety that had been

mounting throughout July reached something very like panic the day the fall of Rostov was announced. Looking back on this period there is no doubt that the psychological

operation undertaken as a result of the fall of Rostov was highly salutary; throughout August, the mood in the country continued to be grim, but no longer panicky, and by

some curious instinct, people were expecting a change for the better as the Germans

approached Stalingrad.

It was after the fall of Rostov that the Russian command called a halt with Stalin's "not a step back" order, read to the troops on July 30, and although this was very far from being literally carried out—for the retreat continued rapidly in the Northern Caucasus and (more slowly) in the Don country, on the way to Stalingrad, something, as we shall see, had changed in comparison with the earlier part of the summer campaign.

More valuable contributions to our understanding of this period than the official histories are the reminiscences by a number of Russian generals who played an active part in the operations, such as Marshal Yeremenko's and Marshal Chuikov's. No doubt, like generals the world over, they have axes to grind about some of their colleagues; but what emerges most clearly from their reminiscences (and this was not altogether clear at the time) is not only that some Russians generals were good, and others quite useless, but that the morale and efficiency of some of the troops was high, while other Russian troops retreating to Stalingrad were almost completely demoralised.

An even more vivid picture of what was going on in the south is given in certain novels written after the war, such as Fadeyev's Young Guard, or in films like the much more recent Ballad of a Soldier—with all the roads teeming with refugees who were being attacked from the air; trains that were being wrecked by German bombers; troops in more or less disorderly retreat—scenes of horror reminiscent of the worst days of 1941 but with the difference that in 1942 there was practically nowhere further to retreat to. Or more precisely, the limits were Stalingrad and the Caucasus foothills. There was a frantic feeling in the country that if the Germans were not to be stopped there, then the war would be as good as lost.

The military situation at the end of July and the beginning of August was certainly

looking serious for the Russians. There was very heavy fighting inside the Don Bend, and the Germans had already crossed the river at Tsymlianskaya. They were clearly on their way to Stalingrad. Meanwhile, the Russians were in full retreat in the Kuban. By August 3 the Germans, advancing from their Tsymlianskaya bridgehead, had reached

Kotelnikovo, and they then continued their advance, more slowly, towards Stalingrad

until August 18. The only redeeming feature was the Russian success in firmly holding the country north of the Don Bend as well as a number of bridgeheads within the bend itself, notably at Kletskaya. They also later captured a bridgehead at Serafimovich, which, as we shall see, was to play an important part in the Russian counter-offensive at Stalingrad in November.

In the Caucasus the German advance was much more rapid. By August 11 the fighting

had spread in the west to the oil town of Maikop, and to Krasnodar and the Germans were penetrating the mountains on their way to the Black Sea coast. In their southern thrust, they had, by the 21st, occupied the famous watering places, Piatigorsk, Essentuki and Kislovodsk in the Caucasus foothills, and soon afterwards planted the Nazi flag on the top of Mount Elbrus. In their south-eastern drive they were crashing ahead towards the vital oil areas of Grozny and Baku.