Russia at war 1941-1945

interesting new facts in this story: the mixed feelings produced by the Soviet-German pact, the great anxiety caused in Russia by the rapid collapse of France, the sneaking sympathy and admiration for Britain (especially among Soviet intellectuals) during the blitz winter of 1940-1, and the great relief, reflected even in Pravda editorials and in Molotov's speeches, at the thought that, after the fall of France, Britain was, with American support, continuing the war and that a German victory was still very far from being a foregone conclusion! Regardless of all the official bluster about the invincibility of the Red Army, anxiety in the country grew very rapidly during the first half of 1941.

Despite all Stalin's and Molotov's absurd attempts after the fall of Yugoslavia and Greece to put off the evil hour by at least a few months or even weeks, they both knew that a showdown with Germany was now inevitable, as seems apparent from Stalin's "secret"

talk to the military academy graduates at the beginning of May 1941. His only hope now was to gain just a little more time. There also seems little doubt that some of the more clear-sighted Russian soldiers already had the possibility—and desirability—of an

Anglo-Soviet alliance at the back of their minds.

In conclusion I wish to express my deepest appreciation to the Louis M. Rabinowitz

Foundation of New York for their generous grant which has helped to meet so many of

the expenses connected with the writing of this book.

My warmest thanks also go to my friend Bobby Ullstein for her frequent good advice and her untiring work on the proofs—which is far more than one normally expects from one's publisher's wife! I also thank my friend John G. Pattisson for his great help in seeing the book through the press.

Finally, I wish to record my special gratitude to John Erickson of Manchester University, our leading authority on the Red Army and author of the admirable Soviet High

Command, for reading the greater part of the manuscript and for making many valuable and helpful criticisms and observations.

A.W.

PART ONE Prelude to War

Chapter I RUSSIA'S 1939 DILEMMA

On May 4, 1939 there appeared in Pravda and in all other Soviet papers a small paragraph entitled:

UKASE OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET ON THE

APPOINTMENT OF V. M. MOLOTOV AS PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF

FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR.

It read:

The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR

V. M. Molotov is appointed People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs. The two

functions are to be exercised concurrently.

Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

M. Kalinin

Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

A. Gorkin

There was no mention of Maxim Litvinov, who had resigned on the previous day "at his own request" and whom Molotov had so abruptly replaced at the head of Soviet

diplomacy, or of any other post he had been given instead. The small news item caused a sensation throughout the world, where it was interpreted as the end of an epoch.

Hitler himself, at the famous military conference of August 22, 1939—the day before the signing of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact and barely ten days before the

invasion of Poland—declared to his generals: "Litvinov's dismissal was decisive. It came to me like a cannon shot, like a sign that the attitude of Moscow towards the Western Powers had changed."

This, like countless other statements to the effect that the dismissal of Litvinov and his replacement by Molotov meant a "decisive" change in Soviet foreign policy, is much too simple. The most that can be said is that the ukase of the Supreme Soviet of May 3

marked the official end of the "Litvinov epoch"; but this had, in fact, been petering out over a very long period, especially since Munich in September 1938, a settlement from which the Russians had been ostentatiously excluded.