Russian History: A Very Short Introduction

In 1844, Nicholas I visited Britain to consult about arrangements to be made in case of Ottoman collapse. He proposed that Russia should take land in the Balkans and Caucasus, place a garrison on the Bosphorus, and declare Constantinople a free city, while Britain would gain Egypt, and Austria the western Balkans. Nicholas left London thinking that he had reached a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ with Palmerston. Actually, though, British statesmen construed Russian aims as naked imperial expansionism, and their view was supported by press and parliament, which were increasingly Russophobic. The resulting distrust did a great deal to ensure that further disputes over the Holy Places in Palestine led to outright war in 1853–4. During that war, Britain did its utmost to destroy the Black Sea Fleet, and to detach from Russia the Caucasus, Finland, the Baltic provinces, and Poland – thus aiming at the obverse of Russia’s grandiose imperial objectives. Such were the outsize hopes and fears which surrounded Russia’s position in Europe.

The whole Crimean crisis showed that the vague and portentous diplomacy, the obsession with strength and status, the appeal to religious sentiment, and the attempt to gain potential allies on an adversary’s territory, all of which had served Russia well in dealing with Eurasian steppe opponents, generated alarming and destructive crises when applied in Europe. They actually undermined the peace and stability which Russia generally sought to promote.

The Crimean War also demonstrated vividly the strengths and weaknesses of the Russian army. In areas that required the straightforward application of traditional technology, such as artillery and engineering, it performed well. Indeed, the rapid construction of the Sevastopol fortifications under General Totleben was a remarkable feat which denied the allies swift victory and compelled them to toil for a further year. Again, where simple operations required courage, comradeship, and the capacity to improvise, Russian soldiers had no superiors in Europe. These were the qualities which had enabled the Russian army to wage war so successfully throughout the 18th and early 19th centuries.

Now, in the mid-19th century, however, more was required. Both men and especially officers were woefully under-trained. Immaculate parade-ground discipline was no substitute for informed leadership in the field, backed up by competent staff work. Senior officers were still usually courtiers without specialist professional training. Transport and communications remained primitive, and the troops were poorly provided with food, clothing, and medical equipment. The absence of railways was especially felt. Britain and France were able to move troops thousands of miles across the sea more quickly than Russia could a few hundred miles across country. This defect was fatal in such a vast empire. Most of the Russian army never even reached the Crimea: it was guarding the Baltic coastline to prevent enemy landings, or was stationed in Poland and the Caucasus to prevent rebellion. The Russian army was the largest in Europe, but it could not be brought to bear on strategically decisive locations.

Besides, it was so large because it was inflexible. By this time, most nations had trained reserves they could mobilize if war threatened. But for Russia to mobilize serfs – who in any case were untrained – was dangerous to internal security. As the Napoleonic War had shown, mobilized serfs expected to be freed, and could become rebellious if they were not. That meant that in peacetime Russia had to keep its full standing army under arms and ready for combat – a hugely expensive burden, which crippled state finances.

This accumulation of problems helps to explain why a new Emperor, Alexander II (r. 1855–81), who came to the throne in the middle of the Crimean War, at last resolved on radical reform.

Chapter 4

The responsibilities and dangers of the empire

By the mid-17th century, it had become clear that Russia was primarily a north Eurasian empire, rather than an Orthodox ecumene or an embryonic nation-state. The way in which it acquired and extended that empire illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of Russia’s geopolitical situation. It expanded to fill a vacuum which was both alluring and threatening. In Siberia, after defeating the Khanate in 1582, it faced only weak tribes, some of whom put up vigorous resistance, but none of whom could face down Cossacks equipped with firearms. Sweeping them aside, Russia expanded eastward all the way to the Pacific and became the largest territorial empire on earth, with immense resources. The exploitation of them, however, was hampered by the sheer size and remoteness of the territory.