Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

Von Langermann, the XXIV Panzerkorps commander, had been alerted to the presence of Soviet armour for several days and he shifted both the 9 and 11.Panzer-Divisionen to protect 4.Panzerarmee’s left flank near Bolshoy Polyana. Langerman also had time to coordinate with the neighboring XIII Armeekorps, which established a firm defensive line facing toward the threatening Soviet armour. Nevertheless, Rotmistrov’s two tank brigades managed to push back 11.Panzer-Division’s covering forces and advance 10km before encountering the main German defensive positions behind the Kobylia Snova river. On 7 July, one of Popov’s tank brigades arrived, but the 9.Panzer-Division joined in the fight and claimed to have knocked out sixty-one tanks, which halted Rotmistrov’s advance. It was not until 8 July that Popov got the rest of his corps into action and, together, the 7th and 11th Corps forced the 9 and 11.Panzer-Divisionen to fall back 6km to the Sukhaia Vereika River. Heavy fighting continued along the river on 9–10 July, with about 260 Soviet tanks opposing 200 German tanks. Although initially surprised by the weight of the Soviet armoured attack, the Germans gradually gained the upper hand as their air superiority enabled them to relentlessly hammer the Soviet formations with Stuka bombardments. Without effective artillery support, the Soviet tank corps also had difficulty suppressing the German anti-tank guns, hidden in the tall grass. On 12 July, the 11.Panzer-Division mounted a major counterattack that routed the 2nd and 7th Tank Corps, which effectively brought the 5th Tank Army’s counter-offensive to an ignominious end. Between 6 and 15 July, Liziukov 5th Tank Army suffered nearly 8,000 casualties and lost 341 tanks destroyed, including 130 T-34, fifty-eight KV-1 and fifty-one Matilda II. The 5th Tank Army had just 27 per cent of its tanks, half of which were T-60 light tanks, still operational by the time the counter-offensive ended. In contrast, the 9.Panzer-Division lost only thirty-nine tanks (two Pz.II, twenty-eight Pz.III, nine Pz.IV) since the start of Blau and still had ninety-four operational tanks.

Hoth’s advance to Voronezh was a resounding success for the Panzerwaffe, resulting in the seizure of important terrain along the Don. While no major Soviet formations were encircled and destroyed, ten Soviet tank corps were mauled in the battle and their clumsy performance indicated that the Red Army was not yet ready to conduct large-scale armoured combat toe-to-toe with the Wehrmacht. Even the best Soviet armour commanders, Katukov and Rotmistrov, had turned in very lackluster performances due to the improvised nature of Soviet operational planning. As a result of the German capture of Voronezh, the Stavka created the Voronezh Front to hold a sector along the Don. As operations wound down around Voronezh, Hitler and the OKH began to implement the next phase of their summer offensive. Heeresgruppe Süd was broken up into two smaller formations in order to pursue separate objectives at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus: Heeresgruppe A and B. Von Bock would command Heeresgruppe B, which included Hoth’s PzAOK 4 and AOK 2, as well as the 2nd Hungarian, 3rd Romanian and 8th Italian Armies. Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List took command of Heeresgruppe A, which included von Kleist’s PzAOK 1 and Paulus’ AOK 6. However, Hitler wanted Hoth’s 4.Panzerarmee sent south immediately after the capture of Voronezh to support the AOK 6 advance to Stalingrad, but von Bock was reluctant to release all the armour due to 5th Tank Army’s counteroffensive. Hoth and von Bock effected a compromise, sending the XXXXVIII Panzerkorps south, but keeping the XXIV Panzerkorps engaged with Liziukov’s armour for another week. Hitler became increasingly upset with von Bock’s foot-dragging, which was justified by the tactical situation, but which threatened to upset German operational plans. Finally, Hitler relieved von Bock of command on 15 July and promoted Generaloberst Freiherr Maximilian von Weichs from command of AOK 2 to command of Heeresgruppe B. Thus, Liziukov’s armoured counterattack had unforeseen consequences, in that the delay imposed upon 4.Panzerarmee in supporting the drive on Stalingrad contributed to the German failure to seize the city by coup de main as occurred at Voronezh.

Von Kleist’s Panzers Head for the Oil, 9 July–6 September