Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

Von Kleist’s Panzerarmee 1 had waited behind the Donets while Hoth’s panzers smashed in the Bryansk and Southwestern Fronts. By the time that von Kleist attacked at dawn on 9 July, the Southwest Front was already off-balance, with its left flank falling back under the hammer blows of AOK 6’s pursuing XXXX Panzerkorps. Von Kleist deployed his III and XIV Panzerkorps on line with the 14, 16, and 22.Panzer-Division side-by-side and conducted a frontal assault against four rifle divisions of Kozlov’s 37th Army. Kozlov only had a single tank brigade with forty-six tanks to oppose Kleist’s 330 tanks, so the Soviets fell back rather than face encirclement and annihilation, as they had before. AOK 17 joined the offensive on 11 July, slowly pushing the Southern Front back toward Rostov.

At this point, with the entire Soviet front between Voronezh and the Sea of Azov in flux, Hitler issued Führer Directive 43, which made ill-judged alterations to the Blau operational plan: Hoth’s panzers were transferred to Heeresgruppe A for the drive into the Caucasus, rather than supporting the AOK 6 drive on Stalingrad.

Within six days, Mackensen’s III Panzerkorps ended up conducting a great wheel, turning southeast and ending up behind the 12th and 37th Armies. The Soviet 12th Army was forced to abandon Voroshilovgrad and hastily retreat to avoid encirclement. Veiel’s XXXXVIII Panzerkorps from Hoth’s 4.Panzerarmee joined up with von Kleist’s two corps, reinforcing the great armoured wheel to the southeast, with the Southern Front in full retreat. The German motorized infantry divisions, each reinforced with their own Panzer-Abteilung, proved their worth in a pursuit operation: the Grossdeutschland and 16 and 29.Infanterie-Divisionen (mot.) raced ahead of the panzer divisions and reached the Don river east of Rostov by 17 July. Once this occurred, the Southern Front fell back through Rostov, leaving only elements of the 56th Army to defend the city. General der Panzertruppen Friedrich Kirchner’s Gruppe Kirchner (LVII Panzerkorps and XXXXIX Gebirgs-korps), which up to this point had been sitting on the sidelines, advanced 30km on 21 July and approached Rostov from the west with the 13.Panzer-Division, SS-Division Wiking and three infantry divisions. This action was also the combat debut of Waffen-SS armour on the Eastern Front, with SS-Sturmbannführer Johannes-Rudolf Mühlenkamp’s SS-Panzer-Abteilung 5 leading the way into Rostov. Simultaneously, Mackensen’s III Panzerkorps also approached Rostov from the north – four German mechanized divisions closed in on the city. Three layers of anti-tank ditches and mines slowed, but did not stop the advance of German armour into the city. A company of Brandenburg infiltration troops was attached to the 13.Panzer-Division, which assisted them in seizing key points in the city. On 22–23 July, Wiking and 13.Panzer-Division fought their way into western Rostov, which was burning and covered by dense clouds of smoke. The Soviets fought the battle with rearguards, enabling the Southern Front’s remaining armour to escape across the Don. For the first time, German armour was involved in serious fighting in an urban environment, which made panzer commanders fearful of sticking their heads out of their cupolas due to the threat posed by Soviet snipers. Most of the streets were blocked with obstacles, which severely limited the tactical mobility of the Panzer-Abteilungen. Several centers of resistance, such as the NKVD headquarters building, required close tank-infantry coordination to reduce. After a tough fight, most of the Soviet rearguards pulled back across the Don on the night of 24–25 July, although mop-up continued in Rostov until 27 July.⁴⁴

Despite the capture of Rostov, von Kleist’s armour would not be able to reach the oil fields in the Caucasus if the 56th Army blew up the main rail bridge over the Don River at Bataysk. Without a rail bridge over the Don, Heeresgruppe Süd would not be in a position to support a deep thrust into the Caucasus for weeks, which would have given the Southern Front time to recover. The railroad bridge was not the only obstacle, but a long causeway over marshy terrain, followed by another bridge – a tailor-made blocking position. Instead, the Soviet 56th Army made the kind of horrendous error which seemed to dog the Red Army even in the second year of the war: they neglected to properly guard or destroy the railroad bridge at Bataysk. During the night of 24–25 July, a small force of motorcycle infantry from the 13.Panzer-Division and some Brandenburg infiltrators slipped across the Don in rubber boats and caught the bridge security detail by surprise.