Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

Although most of the German assault troops were killed and the bridge partly damaged, it was held long enough for a force from 13.Panzer-Division to arrive and secure the bridge, providing von Kleist with his entry point into the Caucasus. This was the place where even a single battalion of T-34 tanks might have brought Operation Blau to a premature halt, but the Southern Front had pulled its armour back from the river. It was a gross blunder, in a war filled with blunders.

Von Kleist sent two infantry divisions across into the Bataysk bridgehead to clear out the town and marshland, giving his panzers a brief pause. East of Rostov, the XXIV and XXXX Panzerkorps had already established four small bridgeheads with pontoon bridges across the lower Don and the 3.Panzer-Division was across in force. After Rostov fell, the German intelligence estimate of Soviet forces and dispositions in the Caucasus was vague.

In fact, General-polkovnik Rodion I. Malinovsky’s Southern Front had only five very beat-up armies with 112,000 troops stretched along a 300km-wide front south of the Don. Malinovsky knew that the Stavka was going to send most of its reserves to support the fighting around Voronezh and Stalingrad and that he was more or less on his own for some time. On 25 July, von Kleist began his advance into the Caucasus by probing southward with elements of XXXX and XXXVIII Panzerkorps. The 3 and 23.Panzer-Divisionen, along with 16.Infanterie-Division (mot.) easily smashed the thin defenses of the 37th Army and plunged deep into the steppe, toward the Manych River. In response, the Soviet 51st Army flung the 135th and 155th Tank Brigades against the flank of the 23.Panzer-Division at Martinovka on 28–29 July; the result was a one-sided tank battle where the Soviets lost up to seventy-seven of 100 tanks (a mix of T-34s and T-70s) against only three German tanks. Much of the action was fought at close range, under 300 meters, but Kampfgruppe Burmeister’s gunnery proved far superior to that of the Russian tankers.⁴⁵

By 28 July, Malinovsky could see his front collapsing and he ordered the 12th, 18th and 37th Armies to retreat southward. On 29 July, the LVII Panzerkorps exploded out of the Bataysk bridgehead and 13.Panzer-Division captured Ssalsk on 30 July. Von Kleist’s armour shifted to full pursuit mode, with the LVII, III and XXXX Panzerkorps driving all before them. The LVII Panzerkorps took about 9,000 prisoners in four days, which – while not spectacular – was still about half the front-line strength of the opposing 18th Army.

For the first time in months, German panzer divisions were advancing 20–40km per day against minimal resistance. Morale among von Kleist’s tankers was sky high – pursuit of a broken foe is a heady, intoxicating feeling, while it lasts. Heeresgruppe A split into two parts, with von Kleist’s 1.Panzerarmee pressing on for the oilfields while AOK 17 turned to clear the Kuban. With victory seemingly within von Kleist’s grasp, two factors intervened to hobble the Blitzkrieg. First, Hitler decided to transfer the XXXXVIII Panzerkorps back to Hoth’s command to support the drive on Stalingrad, which was now designated as the priority, not the Caucasus. The OKH also decided to take the Grossdeutschland Division – von Kleist’s strongest motorized infantry division – and send it to Rzhev. Second, von Kleist’s logistic situation deteriorated rapidly once he advanced south of the Don, away from his supply sources, and fuel shortages became endemic. As July ended, the remnants of Malinovsky’s Southern Front were absorbed into Marshal Semyon Budyonny’s North Caucasus Front. Budyonny tasked Malinovsky with stopping von Kleist’s armour with the 12th, 37th and 51st Armies while the rest of his forces tried to stop AOK 17 in the Kuban.