Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt

Despite this success, von Wietersheim complained about the misuse of his armour in urban combat and Paulus relieved him of command and replaced him with Hube. On 27 September, Paulus began his second major offensive, intending to conquer the northern half of Stalingrad. The 16.Panzer-Division joined the offensive from the north, while 24.Panzer-Division advanced from the south. This time, the German schwerpunkt utilized four infantry divisions backed by up to 100 tanks. Attacking toward the Barrikady Gun Factory, the 24.Panzer-Division managed to advance 6km in two days – quite a feat in Stalingrad – but suffered crippling losses to its four Panzergrenadier-Abteilungen. By early October, all three of Paulus’ panzer divisions were badly depleted. Many panzer crews were without tanks by October but, in a demonstration of arrant stupidity, Paulus ordered that dismounted tankers be employed as infantry in the city. The AOK 6’s logistics situation was also very poor, with limited fuel, ammunition and rations reaching the remaining panzer kampfgruppen. Nevertheless, on 14 October, Paulus committed the 14.Panzer-Division and one infantry division to seize the heavily-defended Dzerzhinsky Tractor Factory. Within twenty-four hours, the Germans succeeded in capturing the tractor works, but 14.Panzer-Division suffered 138 casualties and had thirty tanks knocked out. Many of these panzers were quickly repaired, but two days later the 14.Panzer-Division was sent to attack the Barrikady Gun Factory and had seventeen tanks knocked out by dug-in T-34s.⁶⁵ Damaged German tanks were continually repaired, but only enough for limited operations. Some new replacement tanks did reach AOK 6, including two dozen Pz.IIIN, equipped with the 7.5cm KwK L/24 howitzer, which were useful for bunker-busting in the city.

At Stalingrad, Hitler and the OKH exercised insufficient oversight over Paulus and allowed him to let three of the Wehrmacht’s best panzer divisions bleed to death for minimal gains. Paulus’ use of armour in the city was asinine and ignored everything that von Manstein had learned under similar conditions at Sevastopol. Paulus also kept most of XIV Panzerkorps in or near the city, while his long flanks were held only by German and Romanian infantry. It was not until November that Paulus deployed part of the shattered 14.Panzer-Division to help bolster his army’s left flank, but he otherwise refused to pull his armour out of the line to rest and refit.

The Rzhev Meatgrinder, 2 July–30 August

Throughout the winter and spring of 1942, Generaloberst Walter Model’s 9.Armee had been precariously holding the Rzhev salient under intense pressure from Zhukov’s Western Front and Konev’s Kalinin Front. Gradually Generaloberst Walter Model gained the upper hand and began clearing out his rear areas, which were infested with Soviet paratroopers, cavalry and partisans that were still there from the Winter Counter-offensive.

Operation Hannover, which included kampfgruppen from both the 5 and 19.Panzer-Divisionen, eliminated this threat in May–June. During the operation, Model was badly wounded on 23 May and temporarily replaced by Generaloberst Heinrich von Viettinghoff.⁶⁶ As a result of Operation Hannover, the Soviet 39th Army, with seven rifle divisions, was isolated on the west flank of the salient and 9.Armee developed a more ambitious plan known as Seydlitz to remove this thorn from their side. Heeresgruppe Mitte sent the 1 and 20.Panzer-Divisionen to reinforce the operation, providing von Viettinghoff with a total of four panzer divisions.

Operation Seydlitz began on 2 July, with 1 and 2.Panzer-Divisionen mounting pincer attacks from Olenino and Belyy to link up and complete the encirclement of the 39th Army. Even though the distance to be covered was minimal – less than 30km total – the infantry of the Soviet 39th Army stopped both German panzer divisions cold and prevented the narrow corridor leading west from being closed. Admittedly, both German panzer divisions were weak in armour, with only a single Panzer-Abteilung each, but both schwerpunkte had failed. Even worse, the 41st Army just outside the corridor committed its 2nd Guards Motorized Division, 21st and 82nd Tank Brigades to counterattack the German panzer spearheads. Fierce tank combat ensued for several days at the mouth of the Belyy corridor, with the Soviet tankers preventing the Germans from closing the kessel.